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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the establishment and expansion of Hezbollah.  It uses a policy 
perspective in explaining the growth of this organization.  Moreover, it focuses on Israel’s 
disproportionate use of force in Lebanon as a major cause behind the very existence of 
Hezbollah.  The analysis of Israeli policy will be done by examining three separate conflicts as 
case studies.  These events are: the 1982 (Peace for Galilee) invasion of Lebanon that helped to 
create Hezbollah, the 1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath) Hezbollah-Israeli conflict which served 
to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war which solidified 
Hezbollah as a military force in the region. 
The first part of the study analyzes the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to dismantle 
PLO bases and the resulting vacuum filled by Hezbollah.  In an effort to eliminate Hezbollah, 
Israel again invaded Lebanon in 1996 allowing Hezbollah to expand its power based in Lebanon 
by providing a number of services including healthcare, financial services, and construction 
among others.   In 2006, Israel again invaded Lebanon resulting in an increase in weapons 
shipments and funding to Hezbollah from Syria, Iran and a number of other countries, further 
increasing danger to Israel.  These invasions have served to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the repercussions of Israeli military invasions in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Hezbollah Today 
 
In the current world system, the concept of a single world government remains an ideal 
that has not been fulfilled.  As long as this remains the case, one of the major issues in 
international politics will be the state of anarchy that currently exists.  This state of anarchy 
creates an environment where the theory of “Security Dilemma” remains strongly intact and 
plays an important role in international politics.  Within the international system today, a state of 
anarchy exists where state/non-state actors distrust each other due to reciprocal 
misunderstandings.  Because of these misunderstandings, security becomes the number one 
priority for the survival of the state.  Most state actors and many non-state actors attempt to gain 
security by acquiring a strong military edge over their opponents.  This creates an arms race 
whereby real security becomes impossible.  In effect, the goal for security creates insecurity.  
This is what has become known as the “Security Dilemma”.i
If the ultimate method of securing the state is found through the military buildup of 
armaments, the resulting issue becomes at what point does the effort of one state to ensure its 
security become perceived to be a threat by another state?  If by building up arms one state feels 
safe, at what point does it make another state feel unsafe? Since all states currently exist in this 
self-help system, low levels of trust exist, further exacerbating the issue. 
  
ii  One state cannot be 
certain that another states’ defensive buildup cannot or will not be used for offensive capabilities.  
In the case of Israel, the government has repeatedly proven that it will use its arsenal in an 
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offensive capacity.  Moreover, even when used in a defensive capacity, it will do so with the use 
of disproportionate force.  This behavior exists in an international system, where a lack of 
authority in the form of institutions capable of formulating specific rules of behavior and 
enforcing those rules within an international consensus continues to exist. 
When legal experts use the term "disproportionate use of force," they have a specific 
meaning to convey.  The former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague, Rosalyn Higgins, has noted, proportionality "cannot be in relation to any specific prior 
injury - it has to be in relation to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression. iii  
While there is no definition that is agreed upon internationally for what is proportionate in 
response to militant attacks, “Just War Theory” or “Bellum iustum” , a  military ethics doctrine 
of Roman philosophical and Catholic origin states that ‘action must not be taken in which the 
incidental harm done is an unreasonably heavy price to incur for likely military benefit.  Harm 
needs to be weighed particularly but not only in relation to the live and well being of innocent 
people.  The lives of friendly military personnel need to be brought into account, and sometimes 
even those of adversaries.  The principle of avoiding unnecessary force always applies’. iv
 Since Hezbollah’s creation in the early 1980s it has been viewed as a terrorist group by 
many, especially by Israel and the United States.  Begun as a militant group based in Lebanon, 
Hezbollah tactics have included kidnapping foreign journalists and suicide bombings, to using 
anti-tank rockets and versions of cruise missiles.    Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 
1980s and the subsequent battles that have occurred, many have focused on Hezbollah’s creation 
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and its militant actions. With this information, much emphasis has been placed on seeing the rise 
of militancy in Lebanon within a vacuum.    
Successive Israeli governments have put a strong emphasis on how military strategy can 
be used as a solution to the growing power of Hezbollah.  However, they have overlooked key 
issues as to why Hezbollah has become so strong over the years.  For example, were it not for the 
Israeli invasion in 1982, Hezbollah may have never been created.  Furthermore, the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah war greatly bolstered Hezbollah in the region and solidified its power base due to the 
fact that Hezbollah was able to sustain itself against the Israeli military.  These previous 
examples point to the fact that Hezbollah power has increased as a direct result of Israeli military 
strategy in Lebanon.   
It is important to mention that Iran and Syria have both been important conduits for 
Hezbollah in Lebanon.  For all practical purposes, they have both provided support for Hezbollah 
from its inception.  Elements such as the rise of religious extremism in response to post-colonial 
powers and militant nationalism among others are important factors relating to Hezbollah’s 
growth of power. While it is certainly arguable that elements outside of the Israeli military’s use 
of disproportionate force assisted in creating a favorable environment for increasing Hezbollah’s 
power in Lebanon, this author would like to focus on the extent to which Israel’s use of 
disproportionate force has increased Hezbollah’s power over the last three decades.  Rather than 
examine Hezbollah’s causation through an extremist lens, this author wishes to give an 
alternative that shows Hezbollah’s growth in power in Lebanon is directly associated with the 
disproportionate use of force by Israel and not due to the rise of religious extremism as others 
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have suggested in the past.  To provide an examination of this idea, an expansive look will be 
taken to show how Israeli military force increased Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon.  The primary 
purpose of this paper is to explain the rise of Hezbollah power in reaction to Israel’s 
disproportionate use of force in Lebanon rather than as a response to religious extremism.   
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Use of Force 
 
I hypothesize that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has increased 
Hezbollah’s power over the last three decades. .  The central focus of this research is to examine 
and analyze why Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has led to the creation of 
Hezbollah.  This will be done by examining three separate conflicts.  The 1982 (Peace for 
Galilee) invasion of Lebanon that helped to create Hezbollah, the 1996 (Operation Grapes of 
Wrath) Hezbollah-Israeli conflict which served to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally, the 
2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war which solidified Hezbollah as a military force in the region. The 
causal factor here is the Israeli military’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon while the 
effect is the increase in Hezbollah power. 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) states that if a country or non-state 
actor attacks another country, that country is allowed to defend itself.5   You cannot however 
defend yourself with a disproportionate amount of force.  While it is not unheard of for militants 
to operate in or near civilian areas, the Israeli military seems to disregard this when operating 
against militants.  Furthermore, the targeting of civilians goes against the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.6   Among many high profile individuals, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Navi Pillar, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have condemned Israel's 
"disproportionate use of force."7  While there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes a 
proportionate response to attacks, a state is legally allowed to unilaterally defend itself and right 
a wrong provided the response is proportional to the injury suffered and is immediate and 
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necessary.  It must also refrain from targeting civilians and requires only enough force to 
reinstate the status quo.8
In an interview with an Israeli newspaper, the daily Yedioth, the General Officer 
Commanding or GOC Northern Command, Gadi Eisenkot presented his "Dahiyah Doctrine." 
This doctrine is an Israeli doctrine of military strategy relating specifically to asymmetrical 
warfare in an urban setting.  The doctrine provides for the deliberate targeting of civilian 
infrastructure as a means of inducing suffering for the civilian population which thereby creates 
deterrence.
   
9  First used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the doctrine is named after a 
Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut.  Dahiyah consisted of large apartment buildings which were 
flattened by the IDF during the 2006 Lebanon War.10 “We will wield disproportionate power 
against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and 
destruction,” Eisenkot stated.11 Colonel (Res.) Gabriel Siboni recently authored a report through 
Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies backing Eisenkot's statements, “as 
soon as a clash breaks out, the IDF will have to operate in a rapid, powerful and disproportionate 
way against the enemy's actions."12
The relationship between the variables presented is positive and very strong.  Each 
separate Israeli invasion into Lebanon positively affected Hezbollah, both politically and 
militarily.  The theoretical importance of this topic may allow scholars and policy makers to take 
a second look into Israel’s disproportionate use of force and rethink the overall use of military 
force as a deterrent in Lebanon.  The policy importance and significance of this research is that it 
may allow policy makers and researchers to redirect their efforts towards finding a peaceful 
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solution in the region by analyzing Israel’s use of military force in Lebanon.  While Israel has 
been able to defeat the armies of the surrounding Arab states, the creation of Hezbollah has 
become a thorn in the side of the Israeli military apparatus and after a number of conflicts, Israeli 
military actions have yet to be successful.  This is the first time a non-state actor has been able to 
successfully stand up to Israel.   
 
 
The Lebanese Dilemma 
 
Since the year 2000, Israel has been implementing a policy founded on the principle that 
there is no partner for peace and that its military can impose Israeli will on its adversaries.  This 
policy has been carried out multiple times against Hezbollah, causing major damage to 
economically challenged Shiites in Southern Lebanon and increasingly the country as a whole.  
Under the Ottoman Empire, Shiite Muslim rights were not recognized as shown by the formation 
of the Kaymakam (districts) in the 1800s.  With the outbreak of the 1845 confessional troubles in 
the mountains, the great powers, mainly Britain and France, began talks with the Ottoman 
authorities to end the conflict.13  Due to the influence of foreign powers, Shekib Effendi, the 
Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided to create a mixed council, bringing together 
representatives of the various communities of the Lebanon Mountain including the Maronites, 
the Greek Orthodox, the Catholics, the Sunnis and the Druze.  In the continuation of previous 
policies, a Sunni magistrate was chose to represent the Shiite Muslims as well.14   
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Ottoman discrimination continued until the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
recognition of Shiite Muslims in 1926.  While this recognition was a major step forward, the 
annexation of peripheral regions of Lebanon also expanded Shiite barriers, as historical Syria 
was divided and other religious groups further complicated the makeup of the modern day state 
of Lebanon.15  Receiving increased autonomy under Ottoman rule, “lesser Lebanon,” referring to 
Lebanon before its expansion, was able to advance in terms of the development of education, 
culture and infrastructure.  Private foreign schools began to operate in Beirut, along with Lesser 
Lebanon, which was able to advance its infrastructure with a system of roads, a railroad and a 
port.  Healthcare was strengthened with modern hospitals and an expanded healthcare system.16
 
 
In 1920, the Southern region of modern day Lebanon including the cities of Tripoli, 
Saïda, and the Bekaa Valley were annexed.  Many of these areas did not want to be added to 
greater Lebanon.  They historically depended on the former Ottoman state and did not benefit 
from the new growth occurring in lesser Lebanon.17 Cultural and socioeconomic advancement 
did not take place as fast as in other localities in Lebanon proper.18  These annexations created a 
disparity that lasted long after the formal declaration of independence of Lebanon in 1943.  The 
annexations created the environment for a lacking socio-economic situation where the Muslim 
Shiite community faced multiple disadvantages.  The Lebanese national pact created in 1943 
provided a power-sharing agreement amongst the Maronites and Sunni Muslim communities and 
led to the marginalization of the Shiite Muslim community in Lebanon.  Furthermore, despite the 
fact that the Muslim Shiites were now the majority of the population in the peripheral areas, they 
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were excluded in the overall development plans of the country’s central authority.   Moreover, 
the post Ottoman elite remained in power despite facts on the ground showing major changes in 
demographics.   
During the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian factions began establishing themselves in Shiite 
Muslim populated areas of Lebanon, further degrading the situation.  These armed Arab-
Palestinian factions were escalating Fedayeen operations against Israel, and in turn, Shiite 
Muslim populated areas were taking the brunt of Israeli retaliation.  Consequently, many Shiite 
Muslims began moving towards the suburbs of Beirut and slowly creating their own 
neighborhoods around the capital.  During this period, a number of Shiite ulemas (or, “learned 
individuals”) began to gain popularity.  A number of these ulemas began rapidly distinguishing 
themselves by their religious jurisprudence and providing a vision for a better way forward for the 
Shiite Muslim population. 
  
Within a very brief span of time, Imam Mussa Sadr distinguished himself as the most 
political of the ulemas, vying for influence in the region.  Toward the end of the 1960s, Imam 
Sadr became the mouthpiece of the Muslim Shiite community in Lebanon.  After attempting to 
obtain more concessions for his community against the establishment in Lebanon, Imam Sadr 
was reduced to a position lacking any real power for his community although he was still 
regarded as a threat.  Because of his inability to create real change through the central 
government, Imam Sadr decided to create a popular movement, known as the Movement of the 
Disinherited.   The goal of this movement was to provide social and political needs to the 
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Muslim Shiite community of Lebanon, especially those living in Southern Lebanon and the poor 
suburb of Beirut.19
Just five years after being appointed the first head of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council 
(SISC), Imam Sadr gave his defining speech in 1974 where he told a crowd of spectators that the 
Shiite community would no longer be divided with allegiances to Arab nationalist parties and 
Palestinian factionalism among others.
 
20  Through action, the Shiites would achieve their goals 
of unity and strive to better their socio-economic plight.21  The Muslim Shiite community in 
Lebanon was a prime target for social mobilization because traditionally they lacked any real 
power compared to the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.22  The Shiite Muslims in 
Lebanon were the poorest, least educated, and least likely to benefit from government-provided 
services such as health facilities or public utilities.23  Also because of their location, they were 
taking the brunt of the impact of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israeli fighting.  The 
1979 Iranian revolution provided hope to the Muslim Shiites in Lebanon who were demoralized 
and exhausted from the fighting taking place in Lebanon. The revolution provided an illustration 
of what a determined Shiite effort against oppression could accomplish.24 
   The Movement of the Disinherited became the first successful sociopolitical movement 
accessible to the Muslim Shiite community since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.  While learning 
from the armed Palestinian groups striking Israel, Imam Sadr created the armed Afwāj al-
Muqāwamat al-Lubnāniyyah or (AMAL) militia which was trained by the Palestinians during 
the 1970s.  This movement coupled with the negative situation of the Shiite Muslim community 
in Lebanon and the repeated Israeli interference stemming from Palestinian militants led the way 
for the creation and strengthening of the Hezbollah movement.  This movement would later 
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overtake AMAL as the strongest of the Muslim Shiite movements and become Israel’s frontline 
foe.25
Iran also provided Hezbollah with substantial material assistance and weaponry to carry 
out military operations against Israeli targets.
   
26  Moreover, it assisted in creating an Iranian based 
social service network, which was active in spreading Iranian ideology and generating collective 
action.27  Beginning in the early 1990s, Iran also encouraged and assisted Hezbollah to push into 
the Lebanese political sphere.  In addition, Hezbollah received significant assistance from Syria.  
This came in the form of financing, weapons and a transfer point for Iranian weapons and 
training.  Syria viewed assistance to Hezbollah as a means to sustain an alliance with Iran and 
project its foreign policy goals.28
 
   This triangular relationship provided a way for Hezbollah to 
grow, for Iran to export its revolution throughout the Arab world and for Syria to maintain an 
alliance with Iran, creating a stronger force against Israel. 
Past Works 
 
The literature dealing with Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is large and consists of a wide 
range of authors weighing in from varying disciplines. These authors apply a number of theories 
ranging from geopolitical and economic influences to religious and ideological elements.  This 
thesis will cover a wide selection of previous works explaining Israeli actions in Lebanon.  
Because most of the literature in English focuses on how Israel’s use of force has had 
constructive results, this study will use this foundation as a source to show how Israel’s use of 
force in Lebanon has been counterproductive.  This does not mean that no literature exists on 
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Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon however; the majority of the literature focuses 
on a lens though which Israel has been justified in its actions.  Through this research I will trace 
the historical background of Hezbollah and argue that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in 
Lebanon has increased Hezbollah’s power.  This research will be presented in a chronological 
fashion to trace how authors have evolved in their research. 
The literature review on Israeli actions begins with Ehteshami and Hinnesbusch.  Their 
text lays out the framework for understanding Iranian and Syrian foreign policies and the 
historical and contemporary reasoning behind the two state alliance.  Syria, a secular state that 
has used all of its might to push down religious activities in its own country; and Iran, a 
theocratic state that has attempted to expand its religious revolution throughout the region have 
found a way to create an alliance despite high pressure from powers in the region and abroad.29  
This test also explains the unstable environment in which the two countries operate and argues 
how Syria is not a rogue nation as so many authors have suggested; rather, Syria is a power 
exerting weight in the region based on its own interests.30
Furthermore, it is argued that Syrian foreign policy follows the realist view and that 
through its alliance with Iran, is attempting to counter Israeli interference in Lebanon and 
throughout the region.
   
31 Importantly, the authors explain the factors related to understanding the 
Syrian-Iranian alliance and the reasoning behind the intervention in Lebanon.  This study also 
illustrates how Syria’s actions show it to be a conventional actor using Hezbollah’s influence to 
counter Israel in Lebanon.  Overall, the author indicates that states such as Syria and Iran are no 
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more than middle powers on a world scale attempting to exert increased influence in their own 
region.32
Another view is provided by Cordesman where he suggests explanations for the region in 
a strictly militaristic comparison.  The militaries of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, the 
Palestinians and Israel are compared for their effectiveness.  The text explains the rise and 
importance of asymmetry in conflict and that asymmetric war is not only a risk, it is a constant 
reality.  After the state to state wars that took place from the 1940s to the 1970s, lower level 
guerilla style battles began to take place, lasting over a period of years rather than weeks or even 
days.
 
33
 As of the date of the texts publication, the author discusses the fact that three major 
occurrences of asymmetrical warfare have occurred with Israel.  Specifically, the second one 
dealing with Shiite militias backed by Syria and Iran and the Israeli army allied with Christian 
militias in Southern Lebanon.
  The author expounds on the idea that in an army-to-army battle, Israel would be 
triumphant over any of its opponents.  On the other hand, in situations of asymmetrical warfare, 
the Israelis find more difficulty and this is increasingly becoming the case, especially due to 
Hezbollah activities. 
34 On the Israeli side, tactics to physically separate Israeli territory 
from the enemy have been a major strategy used.  These tactics seem to be increasing the fortress 
like mentality being proposed by many Israelis.  On the other hand, this has also emboldened 
Israeli opponents and has led to more attacks on Israeli soil.  Moreover, Cordesman explains that 
Hezbollah views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an extension of its own conflict with Israel 
and this increasingly places Hezbollah within Israel’s radar.35  These dynamics provide even 
14 
 
more impetus for Syria to provide support to Hezbollah, using it as a measure of deterrence 
against Israel.36
In another case study Giraldo and Trinkunas stress the fact that financial and material 
resources are correctly perceived to be the life blood of Hezbollah’s operations. The United 
States government and its allies have determined that along with military action, fighting the 
financial infrastructure of Hezbollah is the most direct way to defeat it.
 
37
This study looks at Iranian support for Hezbollah as a means of continuing to further its 
ideology in the region, particularly in Lebanon.  Estimates report that Iran funds Hezbollah with 
hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
  While the military 
aspect of fighting armed groups is very important, it is also imperative to remember that a great 
deal of information has been learned about sources and mechanisms used to finance 
organizations such as Hezbollah. 
38  This is accomplished through private charities and 
front companies as well as from a number of other sources from around the world; this includes 
the United States, and countries in South America and Africa.39  Iran also provides Hezbollah 
with various weapons routed through Syria.  These weapons range from assault rifles to rockets.  
It has now been cited that Hezbollah is now in control of scud missiles as of 2010.40  Overall, the 
text provides background information on Hezbollah’s well oiled fighting machine including its 
media and social outlets aimed at pushing its message not only in Lebanon but through Israel as 
well.41
Parsi stresses the superheated rhetoric and vitriolic exchanges between Iran and Israel.  
The author states that the roots of enmity lie between the two nations because of historical details 
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of secret alliances and unsavory political maneuverings that undermine Southwest Asian 
stability.42
The scholar also shows the backroom dealings that have occurred between Iran, Israel 
and the U.S. such as the U.S. plan to stop Iran from limiting support to Hezbollah.  While this 
may seem strange at first, it is important to remember that in modern history, Iran and Israel 
were strong allies under the Shah but subsequent the Islamic Revolution, the situation began to 
change dramatically.  This text also talks about Israel’s attempts at keeping good relations with 
Iran’s leadership even after the Islamic Revolution.  This attempt as continuing relations was 
viewed by many as a way of creating alliances against the Arab majority in the region.
  While Trita does explain the relations between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the main 
focus rests with Iran’s support for Hezbollah as a way to deal more effectively with Israel.  
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 created a power vacuum that allowed Hezbollah to take 
hold of the area.  This also provided Iran with a gap within which to expand its revolution in the 
region.  Today, Hezbollah has become the de facto mouth piece of a revolution that occurred 
more than 30 years ago. 
43 After 
Israel and the U.S. attempted to re-create the power base in the Middle East and the defeat of 
Iraq, Iran chose to rid itself of its isolationist stance and choose to become the front line defender 
against Israel.  Above all, this text is about foreign policy and it chooses to explain Israel and 
Iran’s actions in terms of their overall foreign policy goals in the region.44
 Maloney argues that because of the virtue of its size, history, resources, and strategic 
location, Iran is of particular relevance for Southwest Asian stability, especially after the Islamic 
revolution in 1979.
 
45  This scholar systematically outlines Iran's sources of influence in the 
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Muslim world, its dealings with Hezbollah and its strategic ambitions, political innovations and 
economic clout.    Although Iran’s leadership appears mostly stagnant, except for example, in the 
case of Khatami in the 1990s, Iran is in reality one of the least static societies in the Muslim 
world.  Maloney analyzes the social, economic, and regional forces that are driving Iran toward 
change.  Iran also has fluid situations with its neighbors in Iraq and Afghanistan; it feels 
threatened and feels that it must control its surroundings through its foreign policy as much as 
possible.  A primary method used is through its use of Hezbollah in Lebanon.46
Weyhey explores the strengths and limitations of Iran in relation to Hezbollah in 
Southwest Asia.  More specifically, he discusses Iran’s attempt to increase its popularity in the 
Arab world by using Hezbollah as a proxy in the region.  In a sense, he explains, Iran is trying to 
be “more Arab than the Arabs.”
 
47  While Weyhey does explain that Iran and Hezbollah do share 
a strategic relationship, he goes further in saying that Iran does not control Hezbollah.  Iran does 
exert influence over Hezbollah and helps direct its activities but does not have direct control over 
the organization.48  The author shows that Iran is not as strong as it is made out to be in the 
general media with regards to Hezbollah.  Also, Iran has limited ability with its own military in 
terms of being able to perform targeted strikes on its enemies, although it is attempting to 
increase its military ability.  Due to this fact, it has chosen to back proxy groups that are much 
closer to its enemies and are able to exact serious damage deep within the heart of enemy 
territory.49 One such group, Hezbollah, is used in Iran’s revolutionary guard’s “peripheral 
strategy” to extend its influence.  Overall, if it were not for Israel’s disproportionate use of force 
in Lebanon, it is possible that Hezbollah would not exist to counter this strategy today.50 
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Corsi argues that Iran is the largest force behind Hezbollah and that without its support, 
Hezbollah would be primarily a Lebanese organization like many others in Lebanon.51  Although 
Israel has fought two indecisive battles with Hezbollah, strategists are still planning on striking 
both Hezbollah and Iran despite the low rates of success.   The author indicates that Hezbollah 
does not have to go through the normal connections that other organizations do in terms of 
hierarchy because the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nusrallah, has a direct connection with the 
spiritual leader of Iran.52  The author argues that without Iranian support, there would be no 
Hezbollah in terms of its size and power.  Although Hezbollah’s creation is arguably due in part 
to Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon, Iran’s financial support of has been a major 
force allowing it to become the strongest power in Lebanon and one of the strongest military 
forces in comparison to Israel.53 The author also discusses in detail how Israel now feels that it 
must preemptively attack Iran at all costs due to its nuclear weapons program.  On the Iranian 
side, it is felt that Hezbollah can act as a threat to Israel in the case that it chooses to attack 
Iranian soil.  While Israel is persisting in its reliance on military force, it has consistently missed 
the point that this strategy is cause for concern in terms of future repercussions against the Israeli 
nation.54
Goodarzi claims that the Syrian-Iranian alliance created after the revolution in Iran has 
had a major impact towards changing and solidifying certain issues in the region, primarily 
amongst policies regarding Israel.
 
55 Furthermore, the study demonstrates that contrary to 
prevailing views, cooperation between Iran and Syria has been essentially defensive in nature.  It 
came about due to a series of developments, such as Egypt’s signing of the Camp David 
Accords, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and 
18 
 
continued U.S. interference in the region.  This text traces the critical stages of events in the 
region leading to the Iranian-Syrian alliances and provides an explanation for the continuation of 
this alliance despite efforts at pulling the two powers apart.  This author argues that Israel’s use 
of military force in Lebanon has only strengthened the resolve of both Syria and Iran.   More 
recently, the United States has unsuccessfully focused on attempting to weaken the Syrian-
Iranian alliance in Lebanon.  While Hezbollah is key to this alliance, it remains to be seen what 
carrot and stick approach can be used to change the situation.56
 Paul discusses the costs of a preemptive foreign policy in Iraq and how strategies such as 
containment and deterrence have been gaining traction among many policy makers, especially 
those in Israel.  This text offers an agenda for the contemporary practice of deterrence, 
specifically regarding Israeli dealings with Hezbollah.  It can be argued here that Hezbollah has 
become stronger due to Israel’s policy of deterrence in the region.  While this provides an 
alternate view, it must be taken into account that the deterrence angle has led to varying 
outcomes in the region that have not produced positive results.   
 
Israeli military actions have had a negative rather than positive effect in terms of 
deterrence.  This is true especially for states like Iran.  Iran and similar states are attempting to 
increase their projection of power in the region at the expense of Israeli military actions.  Israeli 
strategy has increased the resolve of certain actors such as Hezbollah and provided an impetus 
for them to exist.  During the Gulf war, Iraq was not deterred from striking Israel with scud 
missiles despite the fact that it was known that Israel had nuclear capability.  Iran, for example, 
may be deterred from striking Israel directly because of its nuclear power capability; though, it 
will not deter Hezbollah from striking targets in Israel. 57  Israeli actions have sent the wrong 
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signals in the region, especially in terms of asymmetric warfare.  In plain speak, non-state actors 
do not respond to actions in the same manner as state actors do.58
These various books cover a wide variety of different viewpoints relating to Israel’s 
failure to subdue Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Some authors, like Hinnesbusch, see Hezbollah’s rise 
as a calculated risk taken by regional actors while other authors such as Giraldo and Trinkunas 
take a much more narrow approach and point towards economic causes.  Paul argues that pre-
emptive actions by Israel have caused the rise of guerilla movements. Still, other scholars give a 
historical line of events where various social, religious and external factors explain how this 
movement came to play a huge role in this region of the world.  Cordesman discusses Israel’s 
military strength against other actors in the region and non-state actor influences. However, 
while many authors point to the major role Iran and Syria have had assisting the rise of 
Hezbollah, the majority of texts are lacking because they do not point out the extent to which 
Israel’s own actions in Lebanon have led to failure and the direct rise of Hezbollah. 
 
The particular gap in the literature that will be covered by this work relates Israeli actions 
to Hezbollah’s rise in power.  Rather than examine Israeli military force and argue that military 
actions have been useful as a deterrent against Lebanon, this author wishes to give an alternative 
view that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has been a failure.  Israel has not only 
assisted in increasing Hezbollah’s power but its subsequent invasions of Lebanon have also 
allowed Hezbollah to gain political ground within Lebanon.  I will examine the 1982, 1996 and 
2006 Israeli invasions of Lebanon and the resulting increase of Hezbollah influence in Lebanon.   
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The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon created a catalyst for the creation of Hezbollah.  
Subsequent Israeli invasions and interference in Lebanon created even more reasons for the 
guerrilla group to organize and act as a buffer against Israel.  With the help of Syria and Iran, 
Hezbollah has been able to not only resist Israel on a military front, but also on a political level 
as well.  This factor along with the creation and strengthening of Hezbollah has created a 
situation that has led to failure for the Israelis.  Still today, Lebanon’s top security positions such 
as the head of military intelligence and the director of general security are controlled by Syrian 
approved elements.  Just recently the Prime Minister’s office in Lebanon was given to a pro-
Syrian ally of Damascus, adding to Hezbollah continuous gain on power. 
 
Process Of Examination 
 
This study will be divided into five chapters, examining the presented topic.  The first 
chapter will be the introduction.  This chapter will present the thesis and introduce the key 
parties. It will also provide a background on the subject along with its goals.  The second chapter 
will attempt to persuade the reader that the policies the Israeli military has implemented have 
created many unintended consequences, including popular dissent in the region.  Starting with 
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the dislodging of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
and the creation of Hezbollah, chapter two will attempt to explain the history of Hezbollah and 
its connection to Israel’s use of force.  Second, the Israeli operations of 1996 and 2006 will 
attempt to explain the reaction to Israel’s overt use of force against civilian targets in Lebanon, 
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especially the shelling of Qana and the contribution of popular support for Hezbollah from a 
wide range of the populace.    
 The third chapter will focus on Iranian ideology and the policies that the Ulema of Iran 
have adopted, leading to the strengthening of Iran in Lebanon and throughout the region.  
Hezbollah’s political, social and military support apparatus will be discussed and analyzed to 
understand how Hezbollah has been able to achieve success in a relatively short period of time.  
Hezbollah’s ability to raise funds in the United States will also be analyzed with examples of 
major fundraising acts taking place under the nose of U.S. intelligence.   
The fourth chapter will explain how Syria’s role has created an environment where 
Hezbollah is able to flourish in Lebanon.  With the help of Iran, Syria has been able to exert its 
foreign policy goals because of its use of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  A brief historical outlook of 
Syria in the region will be examined.   Also, an examination of the current crises in Syria will be 
analyzed.  Syria is tied to many organizations in the region and if the current regime were to fall, 
Hezbollah would certainly be affected. 
 The fifth and final chapter will be a conclusion involving a greater understanding of how 
Israel’s military use of force is connected to Hezbollah as well as how the militant organization 
has come into the forefront of not only Lebanese politics but also the pre-eminent threat to Israeli 
security.  While no single bullet has increased Hezbollah’s power, Israeli military incursions into 
Lebanon may provide insight as to how Hezbollah’s power has increased over the past thirty 
years. While both Iran and Syria have also been major instigators in the rise of Hezbollah, it is 
22 
 
this author’s belief that Israel has played the largest role leading to Hezbollah’s increase in 
power.  
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CHAPTER II:  LEBANON 
 
Introduction 
 
To provide an examination of the repercussions of Israel’s use of force, an expansive 
look will be taken at how Israel’s use of military force has led to the creation and rise of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The primary purpose of this paper is to explain the rise of Hezbollah 
power in reaction to Israel’s use of disproportionate force in Lebanon rather than as Hezbollah’s 
creation as a response to religious extremism.  Since its founding, Israel has been successful in 
cementing its existence in Southwest Asia through the use of military force.  Israel has also 
managed to restrain the threats from the surrounding Arab states and prove that it is the superior 
military power in the region.  What Israel has not been able to do is create lasting peace with its 
neighbors.  Moreover, its disproportionate use of military force has led to intense antagonism 
among the civilian population as well as the creation of militant groups such as Hezbollah.  Israel 
has also used such force against another Palestinian led militant group, Hamas.   
In another example of Israel’s failure in asymmetrical warfare, Israel invaded Gaza in 
December of 2008 in an operation codenamed, Operation Cast Lead.  This invasion of the Gaza 
Strip by Israel was in response to repeated rocket fire by Hamas militants into Israel.  Israel's 
stated goal was to stop the rocket attacks coming into Israel. 59 The resulting report released in 
September 2009, stated that both sides of the conflict had committed violations.  It also stated 
that Israel had used disproportionate force by targeting Palestinian civilians, using them as 
human shields as well as destroying civilian infrastructure. Hamas were also found to have 
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targeted Israeli civilians by indiscriminately firing rockets into Israel.  These findings were 
endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council. 60
In September 2009, a United Nations special mission, headed by Justice Richard 
Goldstone, produced a report accusing both the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinian militants 
of war crimes. 
 
61  In January of 2010, Israel’s government released a response criticizing the 
Goldstone Report and disputing its findings.  62  Finally, In 2011, Goldstone partially altered from 
the findings of the initial report by stating that he no longer believed that Israel intentionally 
targeted civilians in Gaza. 63  The remaining three authors of the report, Christine Chinkin, 
Desmond Travers and Hina Jilani, rejected his reassessment. 64  UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon's spokesmen issued a statement stating that while the Secretary-General recognized 
"Israel's security concerns regarding the continued firing of rockets from Gaza," "Israel still had 
an obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law." The statement 
specifically noted that he "condemns the excessive use of force leading to the killing and injuring 
of civilians”. 65
Israeli realism is defined by its Jewish heritage and the Jewish Holocaust of World War 
II.  Because Israel was created by means of war on inhabited land, insecurity has been the pre-
eminent experience.  Therefore, Israeli policy has developed in response to a constant threat of 
conflict.  The key values that Israel must maintain to exist are in constant danger, values such as: 
territorial sovereignty, personal survival and national independence as a democracy for Israel’s 
Jewish citizens.  The Israeli state is in constant fear of being overtaken.  Continuous fear of 
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attack and defeat are ingrained in the Israeli consciousness, along with the belief that Arabs are 
out to destroy Israel.66
International politics in Israel is seen as a zero-sum game where the belief that human 
nature has an ugly side waiting to come out, is well established in Jewish culture and is leading 
to mistrust throughout the world.   Israeli military strategy is to plan for the worst.  Israel’s use of 
military force has been justified by the belief that Israel is acting in accordance with defensive 
policies based upon an encircling threat.  This reasoning self-justifies its actions as being 
defensive rather than offensive military incursions.   Historically, just as Jewish communities 
have built barriers to minimize the impact coming from the outside world, separation has also 
become equal with the survival of the Jewish state.
  
67
  Israeli technological advancements have generated superiority over their Arab 
opponents and have acted as a credible advantage to the threat of Israeli hegemony in the region.  
Historically, Israel fought for its existence knowing that it could use overwhelming force as a 
form of diplomacy to impose results.  The idea of cumulative deterrents' emphasized the thought 
of repeatedly beating your opponent as a way to force permanent acceptance of Israel in the 
region. 
   While Israeli military strategy takes into 
account the fact that the state of Israel must be a safe haven from the outside world, it also takes 
into account acquisitive aspirations related to widening the barriers of the state of Israel.  This 
has been a major point of contention leading to the creation of militant groups such as Hezbollah.   
68
 The surrounding Arab states were put on notice and once their land was obtained 
through war, no land was given back unless it was overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor, nor would 
  Over time Israel’s disproportionate use of force has been used to effectively bring the 
Arabs to the bargaining table using almost any means necessary.  
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the imaginary line drawn in the sand be altered.  Israeli strategists put a great deal of value on 
holding on to what they have accomplished and forcing the other side into submission.69
 Prior to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israeli strategy changed after the 1967 war where 
Israel became the occupier of the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza strip, Sinai and the Golan 
Heights.  These occupied territories became a point of contention amongst Israeli strategists.  
Would they be used as bargaining chips or would they be used to increase Israel’s size and 
therefore its buffer zone?
    Israel 
hoped to create structures from its military actions i.e. buffer zones, security and peace 
guarantees.  Although it has been a long road, Israel has been very successful through the use of 
violence.   Due to its use of force, Egyptian strength and a population of millions succumbed to 
Israeli superiority by the 1970s.  Jordan, with a history of dubious political leadership, also 
accepted the fact that Israel could not be defeated through military means.   On the Arab side, the 
idea that Israel could be decisively beaten in a military battle has slowly come to an end.  On the 
Israeli side, the idea that military force was Israel’s best friend went unchallenged until the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  
70
This debate has continued to the present day.  The more territory Israel has, the more it 
has to defend.  On the other hand, deterrence using extreme and disproportionate force can work 
well without having the need for extended buffer zones.  Israel’s realist approach has succeeded 
in securing the new state; nevertheless, it has meant that it was not likely to create any real 
friendships in the region.  Any attempts to increase security by one of Israel’s neighbors meant 
that Israel would also increase its own security, creating a never-ending race.  Israel’s use of 
disproportionate force eventually led Syria and Jordan to put down anti-Israel actions directed 
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from their state; though, one state that encountered problems with this was Lebanon.  Lebanon, 
from its inception, functioned as a quasi failed state and has been ever since.  Lebanon allowed 
first the PLO to launch attacks onto Israeli territory, and then after the Israelis invaded Lebanon 
in 1982, an even stronger organization developed in the form of Hezbollah.  Since that time, 
Israel has become engaged in a low level war on its northern border.  With occasional serious 
flare-ups, Hezbollah has become one of the most serious threats to Israeli security. 
 
Unintended Consequences 
 
Beginning with Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israel attempted to eliminate the PLO 
from Southern Lebanon.  This action took place because after the Palestinians were pushed out 
from Jordan, they came into Lebanon and shortly took over the Palestinian refugee camps in the 
south, converting some into military training grounds.71  The Palestinians began taking part in 
cross-border attacks against Israeli targets from Lebanese territory, as opposed to their previous 
strongholds in Jordan.    As Palestinian influence began to increase in Lebanon, the Palestinian 
fighters were able to create a state within a state.72
As Palestinian attacks began to increase, so did the Israeli response.  Had it not been 
Israeli practice to use overwhelming force, the surrounding Lebanese population would not have 
been affected to such a degree.  Israeli strikes on Lebanese villages were becoming more 
   The Israelis would retaliate with 
overwhelming air superiority and bomb Palestinian refugee camps.   These airstrikes would often 
be accompanied with strikes on the local Lebanese population, specifically Muslim Shiites in 
South Lebanon.  
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frequent, creating tensions between Israel and the Palestinian Arab fighters as well as the local 
Arab population in Lebanon.  One example of this occurred on July 10, 1981.  After strikes on 
Israel by the PLO, Israeli retaliation occurred through Israeli air strikes.73  On July 17, the Israel 
Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut.  Roughly three 
hundred people were killed and eight hundred wounded, the majority of them civilians.74
In 1982, the Israeli government decided to put a stop to Palestinians attacks and began 
waiting for a strategic moment.  According to George Ball, the seventh U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations, the PLO continued to observe the ceasefire implemented earlier by both Israel 
and the Palestinian authority.
   The 
Israeli army also targeted PLO positions in South Lebanon, hitting local civilians in the process 
without being able to stop Palestinian rocket fire.  By the mid 1970’s, tensions between the 
Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon and local inhabitants came to a head erupting in armed conflict 
within Lebanon.  As the war continued in Lebanon, the Palestinian militants continued the ebb 
and flow of attacks against Israel until the Israeli government decided to put a stop to Palestinian 
attacks once and for all.   
75  Alexander Haig, U.S. Secretary of State, also said that Israel 
continued to look for an internationally recognizable act that would be necessary to obtain 
American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.76   In April of 1982, an Israeli diplomat 
was killed in front of his apartment in Paris, increasing tensions.  Despite this assassination, the 
official premise for the Lebanese invasion was that the Palestinians had managed to acquire 
long-range rockets, capable of hitting deeper targets within Israel.  Israel’s strategic timing came 
about when on June 3, 1982, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, was 
shot and paralyzed by Abu Nidal’s Fatah organization.77  Although the Abu Nidal group was a 
29 
 
main competitor and rival group of Yasser Arafat’s PLO, and the shooting carried out by the 
Abu Nidal group was a clear provocation against the PLO, the Israeli cabinet agreed to invade 
Lebanon. 
 
Operation “Peace for Galilee” 
 
Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Minister of Defense at the time informed the cabinet that the 
invasion of Lebanon would last roughly three days.  Israeli troops were not to go deeper than 25 
miles into Lebanese territory and they were not to engage Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon.78  
The overall goals of the operation were to eliminate the PLO, install a Christian- Israeli friendly 
government in Beirut and limit Syrian interference in Lebanon.  Israel’s plans were thwarted 
from the onset of military activities.  Despite Israel’s military superiority over the PLO, it took 
over 48 hours to take over a main PLO stronghold in Sidon.  And while the mission was 
successful in driving out the Palestinians from Southern Lebanon, the Israeli forces broke their 
own rules of engagement of not going deeper than 25 miles and laid siege to the Lebanese 
capital, Beirut.79
Due to Israel’s extension over its original limited war plan and its disproportionate use of 
force in Lebanon, the Israeli army reported that 140 Israeli Defense Force Soldiers (IDF) refused 
to serve in Lebanon and were sent to jail.
   Israeli troops surrounded Beirut and bombed PLO positions from the air and 
the ground, frequently hitting civilians, many of whom belonged to the Shiite community.   
80  Israel’s plan to install a pro-Israel leader in Lebanon 
also came to a halt as the anti-Syrian Bashir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon and 
assassinated one month later.   
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While his brother, Amin Gemayel, was elected President by the national assembly, 
shortly thereafter, Syria was able to assert its influence, not only militarily against Israel but also 
within Lebanon, permanently ending any plans for a Lebanese government friendly towards 
Israel.  Furthering Israel’s failure in 1982, the IDF was unsuccessful in driving out Syrian forces 
and this led to the massive strengthening of Syrian influence in Lebanon.  Within a short period 
of time, Syria was able to have almost total control of internal and external Lebanese policies. 
Israel not only failed to achieve security for its northern border through the “Peace for 
Galilee” war, it created a much more potent and longer lasting problem for itself, Hezbollah.  As 
the war continued, the downtrodden Shiite Muslims of Southern Lebanon became more active 
and were able to unite based on similar grievances.  Initially, the Muslim Shiites of Southern 
Lebanon viewed the IDF as liberators because they were no longer under the tutelage of the 
Palestinian forces.  Many Muslim Shiites were upset that the PLO was causing the infliction of 
damage onto their neighborhoods.  Later, the IDF began to align themselves with the Maronite 
Christians of Lebanon to the detriment of the Muslim Shiites.  This factor, coupled with the 
unfortunate fact that the IDF did not withdraw after driving out the PLO caused the Shiites to 
rethink their presence.  
As a result, the Muslim Shiites turned their attention towards getting rid of the IDF 
soldiers and freeing South Lebanon from foreign interference.  While the PLO lost its hold on 
Southern Lebanon and their forces were transferred to Tunisia, Iran had been longing for the 
ability to spread its influence in the Arab world and it found it within the Shiite Muslim 
community of Lebanon.   
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During “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the Iranian government sent some 1,500 
revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) to the Bekaa valley to train Arab Shiite Muslims in Lebanon.81
Iran’s financial backing allowed Hezbollah to increase its membership and augment its 
standing among the Shiites in Southern Lebanon.  Due to the Lebanese government’s inability 
and neglect of the Muslim Shiite community, Hezbollah was even able to begin a social welfare 
program to enhance its image within the region.
   
With the acceptance of Hafez al-Assad of Syria, the Pasdaran trained the Shiites in the south and 
began to reinforce the Ayatollah Khomeini’s insistence on spreading the Islamic Revolution.  
The main reasoning behind this was to establish an Islamic revolutionary movement in Lebanon, 
mimicking that in Iran and eventually turning Lebanon into an Islamic state.  As the Lebanese 
war ebbed and flowed, the Pasdaran troops were able to train Hezbollah fighters and turn them 
into a united fighting force.  Hezbollah was very limited in terms of resources but thanks to Iran, 
it was backed militarily, spiritually and financially.   
82   This welfare program provides inexpensive 
healthcare, rebuilds homes for those affected by Israeli strikes, and provides income assistance to 
those who have lost family members while fighting the Israelis.  All of these actions have 
increased Hezbollah’s popularity in South Lebanon.  Hezbollah even provides discount 
supermarkets, scholarships for college, and schools for the needy.83
It is also interesting to note that during the late 1980s, Iran’s leadership changed hands 
from Ayatollah Khomeini to a more moderate Hashemi Rafsanjani.  The result of this was the 
replacement of the hard-line Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sheik Subhi al-Tufayli with the 
more moderate Sheik Abbas al-Musawi in 1990.  After a mere two years of leading Hezbollah 
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and moderating Hezbollah’s stance in the region, an Israeli air raid killed both al-Musawi and his 
wife along with their child and a number of bodyguards.   
In his place, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah was appointed to take the position.  As a moderate, 
Nasrallah and the Iranian leadership wanted Hezbollah to enter into the Lebanese political arena.  
Hezbollah entered the 1992 parliamentary elections and were successful in gaining eight seats 
including 4 Shiite Muslims, as well as 2 Sunni Muslim and 2 Christians running on the 
Hezbollah ticket.  This provided Hezbollah with the largest bloc in parliament.84
Despite all of the repercussions of operation “Peace for Galilee,” the Israelis did not learn 
from their mistakes.  Once the war was over, Israel had succeeded in dislodging the PLO from 
Southern Lebanon but had failed to install an Israeli friendly government.  It is estimated that 
almost 18,000 Lebanese were killed during the first year of the invasion alone.  The war itself led 
to the emigration of over 850,000 Christian Lebanese, leading to a continual change in 
demographics against Israeli interests in Lebanon.
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  The Shiite Amal organization created by al-
Sadr, stopped fighting the PLO and switched its allegiances due to Israel’s disproportionate use 
of force and the killing of many Muslim Shiites in Lebanon.  Most importantly, the Israeli 
invasion led to the creation of Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria.  
 
 
Operation “Grapes of Wrath” 
 
While low-level conflict continued between the IDF and Hezbollah fighters for many 
years, combat remained within the confines of South Lebanon.  Despite this fact, the Israeli 
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government was again looking to invade Lebanon and this time put a stop to Hezbollah fighters 
as they had done to the PLO just over a decade before.  On March 30, 1996, two men working on 
a water tower in Yater, Lebanon were killed by an IDF missile strike.  Hezbollah retaliated by 
launching twenty missiles into northern Israel and the IDF later acknowledged that the attack on 
Yater was a mistake.  Next, a roadside bomb killed a 14-year-old Lebanese boy and injured three 
others in Barashit, a village in Lebanon.  Hezbollah again retaliated by firing 30 missiles into 
northern Israel.  Two days later, on April 11, 1996, Israel announced the “Grapes of Wrath” 
operation as a retaliatory invasion against Hezbollah.   
Israel wanted to punish the general Lebanese populace for supporting Hezbollah and it 
thought that by making the Lebanese public suffer, it would distance them from Hezbollah.  This 
would also force the Lebanese government to put more pressure on Hezbollah to stop its 
activities.   Moreover, the Israeli Defense Force was to create disorder in the south, creating an 
untenable situation for Hezbollah.  On April 11, 1996, Israeli aircraft and artillery began the 
bombardment of Southern Lebanon, multiple targets in and around Beirut and the Bekaa Valley.  
The IDF conducted air raids on Hezbollah installations as well as civilian infrastructure.   
 By the April 13, Israel had blocked major Lebanese ports, including the ports of Sidon, 
Beirut and Tyre.   Within 48 hours of the blockade, the civilian electric power stations of 
Bsaleem and Jumhour were bombed and destroyed.  Multiple bridges were bombed and over 
2,000 civilian homes were destroyed in Southern Lebanon alone.  The total economic damage 
was estimated at over half a billion dollars.  Israel also estimated the total damage it suffered at 
just over 50 million dollars.86
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The Shelling of Qana 
 
On April, 18, some 800 civilians were taking refuge in a United Nations compound in 
Qana.  Hezbollah fighters, hundreds of meters away, fired multiple rockets and mortars at Israeli 
troops.  In response, Israel fired 38 shells within 15 minutes of the shelling, many equipped with 
fuses allowing them to detonate above ground.87   As a result of this bombing, 106 civilians were 
killed, including 24 children, with scores wounded.88
While Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, attempted an information campaign to push 
the Lebanese to distance themselves from Hezbollah, the attempt backfired and nearly the entire 
countries’ religious and political establishment rallied around Hezbollah.  Also, both Christians 
and Muslims took part in daily protests in favor of Hezbollah in addition to providing donations 
for the Islamic Resistance.
 Despite numerous reports from Amnesty 
International, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and others, reflecting on the flagrant use 
of force by Israel in the region, the Israeli government firmly placed the blame on Hezbollah.   
89
This “rally around the flag” effect, coupled with the Qana massacre, not only kept 
Hezbollah in place but also solidified it in the Lebanese political structure as well. Israel’s 
attempts at creating a gap between the general population and Hezbollah by using 
disproportionate amounts of force to compel civilians to point the finger at Hezbollah backfired.  
This turned not only the country, but the world’s attention towards Israel’s justifications for 
using extreme force. 
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The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War 
 
Explaining the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, Israeli actions proved to be a failure for Israel 
and a success for Hezbollah.  Primarily, Israel’s military objectives were to re-establish 
deterrence despite having failed in the 1996 conflict and to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to 
threaten Israel.  Furthermore, Israel wanted to obtain the release of its captured soldiers, the 
catalyst that sparked the 34 day conflict.  Similar to Israel’s goals in 1996, “Operation Grapes of 
Wrath,” Israel sought to pressure the Lebanese public by making them suffer from a 
disproportionate use of force.90
The punishment strategy used by Israel also consisted of a psychological warfare 
campaign.  Israeli psy-op units were able to send messages to mobile phones across the south, 
they also hijacked phone lines and sent Lebanese civilians Israeli-based phone calls as well as 
cell phone text messages telling the locals to show their disapproval of Hezbollah.   Israel 
activated psychological warfare units to execute operations within Lebanon as well.
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    They 
attempted unsuccessfully to shut down the al-Manar television station by bombing it.  This 
strategy was created to put Hezbollah in a negative light within Lebanon and attempt to gain 
support from the Lebanese population.  Israel deleted Hezbollah websites and set up false 
websites appearing to be backed by Hezbollah.  They also managed to put up negative messages 
on official Hezbollah websites and dropped leaflets attempting to appeal to Lebanese civilians to 
stop supporting Hezbollah. 
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Figure 1 Israeli pamphlet showing how Hezbollah is taking Lebanon into the abyss 
 
 
 
Similarly to “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Israel used disproportionate force as a strategy 
to achieve its goals.  Israeli airpower was used throughout the south of Lebanon so as to limit 
casualties on the Israeli side.  Weapons used to target Hezbollah were also used to cause harm to 
the civilian population so that they would point the finger at Hezbollah and blame them for 
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Israeli actions.  Israel did not want to commit ground forces due to their losses in the 1996 war 
which signaled weakness, further emboldening Hezbollah fighters.   
Israeli experts commented that the damage inflicted against Lebanon’s civilian 
population weakened the effects of Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah.93   Israeli 
airstrikes resulted in over $7 billion in damage to Lebanon, over 1,200 civilian deaths and over 
130,000 civilian structures destroyed.94  Due to these results, it is plausible that the 
disproportional use of force committed by Israel in Lebanon increased the anger of the majority 
of the Lebanese population as well as the Arab and Muslim world.  This created even more 
backing for Hezbollah.95
Militarily, Israel wished to eliminate Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and stop the threat of 
rocket fire into northern Israel.  Consequent to the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah was able to launch 
approximately 4,000 rockets into northern Israel during the 34-day period.   Thousands of 
Israelis were forced into bomb shelters and over half a million people were displaced from their 
homes.
    Hezbollah was able to provide more social and civil services to the 
south than the central Lebanese government and this was a major factor in their support of the 
organization.  
96  Moreover, Hezbollah was able to prove itself as a fighting force and was provided the 
opportunity to improve its military capabilities through lessons learned from 1996.  Syria and 
Iran were more than happy to replenish its medium and long-range rocket arsenal.97  Hezbollah’s 
success also provided a strong impetus for Syria and Iran to step up their financial and military 
support.  This also created an example for Hamas in the Gaza strip.  They were able to see the 
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affects of Hezbollah on Israel’s military offensive.  This provided an impetus for Hamas and 
similar groups to imitate Hezbollah and also fall under the patronage of Iran and Syria. 
  Once again, Israel was unable to change the political atmosphere in Lebanon and 
therefore failed to pressure the Lebanese government to force Hezbollah’s hand.98   Additionally, 
Israel failed to obtain the release of the two captured soldiers, which sparked the entire conflict.  
Israel also suffered psychological setbacks as well.  Israel permanently lost its air of invincibility.  
The government and the military were criticized for underestimating Hezbollah’s abilities, 
overestimating their own capabilities, as well as not sufficiently preparing for the war. 99
 
  
Regionally, Israel’s use of disproportionate military force in Lebanon lost the historic backing of 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan although they all initially condemned Hezbollah and firmly 
blamed it for the conflict.  As Lebanese civilians continued to die and as the gruesome pictures 
began to steadily flow throughout media outlets, Arab public opinion grew immensely against 
Israel’s bombing campaign in Lebanon.  
Hezbollah’s Arsenal 
 
After Israel’s 1996 invasion into Lebanon, Iran and Syria began resupplying Hezbollah 
with even more state-of-the-art weaponry, reconnaissance equipment and more rockets.   
Hezbollah had proven itself to be a respectable fighting force, able to use sophisticated weaponry 
and remain standing after numerous battles with the IDF.  According to Israeli intelligence, 
planes carrying sophisticated weapons, including long-range Zelzal missiles from Iran have been 
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passed onto Hezbollah through Syria.100
  Among many items, Hezbollah has been equipped with flak jackets to limit injuries and 
deaths of its soldiers, night-vision goggles to spot Israeli targets under the cover of darkness, 
state-of-the-art communication equipment to be able to transfer information to fellow fighters, 
Israeli uniforms to blend in with the IDF during chaotic battles, and even Israeli ammunition.  In 
the period of a few years, Hezbollah has gone from a small resistance organization to a 
sophisticated and well equipped group of fighters.   
   During the 2006 invasion, the Israeli Army struggled 
for many weeks to defeat Hezbollah forces and was ultimately unsuccessful prior to a cease-fire 
being imposed.  Although Hezbollah remained a small militia, it trained like an army and was 
equipped accordingly by Iran and Syria.   
Iran has also provided Hezbollah with Russian-made antitank missiles that have damaged 
or destroyed Israeli tanks, including its most modern tank, the Merkava, known as Israel’s 
indestructible tank.101  Hezbollah has also been equipped with antitank missiles including the 
older Sagger missile.  This missile has been used successfully to fire into and bring down houses 
where Israeli troops are hiding.  Hezbollah fighters also use a large-scale system of underground 
tunnels to move around throughout Southern Lebanon.  These booby trapped tunnels are 
especially useful for soldiers to fire at Israeli targets and then disappear back into the 
underground.  Tactics such as these were learned from Chechen fighters combating invading 
Russian troops while successfully using the Grozny sewer system to evade capture after attacks.  
Syria and Iran have also continued to provide satellite communication systems to Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah has additionally become attuned to gathering intelligence, learning guerrilla-style 
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warfare from events such as the American Revolution, from rebel groups such as the Vietcong, 
and texts such as those written by Mao and Che.102
It is also known that Hezbollah has its own separate telephone system throughout 
Lebanon.  This phone system came under intense scrutiny in 2008 when Iran had used an Iranian 
company that was rebuilding homes that were destroyed during the 2006 war, to lay cables for 
the Hezbollah network. Further claims were made that these cables would link all the militias in 
Lebanon, Syria and Iran.   According to a Lebanese government report, the network is capable of 
tracking 100,000 numbers using a digital format in which each number is five digits long and 
hooks up to Lebanon’s central telephone network.
  Very importantly, Hezbollah fighters are 
trained based on methods learned from the West, mimicking as much as they can from United 
States’ soldiers on the battlefield.   
103
Through professional training from the Pasadaran, Hezbollah has proven that it can 
successfully use generally low-tech antitank and infantry weapons, as well as more high-tech 
Semtex plastic explosives.
 
104  The IDF says that Hezbollah has between 2,000 to 4,000 fighters, 
aided by a larger circle of backup personnel who provide storage of weapons in nearby homes 
and civilian buildings.   They also provide logistics assistance throughout the region.105
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Remarks 
 
Hezbollah is very difficult to fight against because it operates like a revolutionary force.  
It fights within civilian areas, making it hard to attack without hitting civilian populated areas.  
Fighters are trained to set up launchers, fire them and immediately leave the area.  This makes it 
very difficult for Israel to strike legitimate targets.  Furthermore, this provides more incentive for 
Israel to strike those Hezbollah launching sites and blame it on the Hezbollah fighters, leading to 
large casualties.  The Pasdaran has assisted Hezbollah to train and fight like an army, with 
special units for antitank warfare, explosives, engineering, intelligence, communications and 
launching rockets.  The Pasdaran has also taught Hezbollah how to build and use “improvised 
explosive devices” (IED) as well as fire the all important C-802, ground-to-ship missile that was 
successfully used in 2006.106
Iranian Air Force officers have also been sent to Lebanon to train and assist Hezbollah in 
using Iranian made medium-range missiles such as the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5.  Syria has provided 
Hezbollah with 220 millimeter and 302 millimeter missiles both being equipped with 
antipersonnel warheads.  Syria has also acquired Russian made antitank weapons and passed 
them to Hezbollah ever more slightly changing the military balance of the region.
 
107  Such 
examples include the Metis wire-guided missile, with the ability to fire up to four rounds per 
minute and the RPG-29, used both as an antitank round with the ability to penetrate armor as 
well as the ability to be used against soldiers.   
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Hezbollah has been successful in destroying the myth that Arab armies have helped to 
create through over 40 years of battle, that the IDF is unbeatable.  Despite sophisticated 
American weaponry, highly skilled Israeli training and the solid friendship of the world’s only 
superpower, Hezbollah has been able to remain standing against Israeli military action.  The act 
of being able to get back up after Israel’s use of overwhelming force has turned Hezbollah into a 
mythical force in the  region and throughout the world.  Hezbollah has been able to prove itself, 
not only on the battle field, but in the social and political sphere as well.   
Each time it is tested by Israeli firepower, Hezbollah manages to come out ahead.  After 
the 2006 war, Hezbollah is much better equipped with sophisticated weaponry provided by Iran 
and Syria.  It is also widely believed in the region that Turkey is covertly assisting Iran to 
smuggle weapons into Syria.  These sophisticated weapons end up in the hands of Hezbollah 
fighters.108
 
  Due to a number of factors, including Turkish public opinion relating to the overt use 
of military force used in Israel, the Turkish government has begun to revise its international 
strategy.  This strategy includes not being as friendly to Israel as past governments have been, 
further isolating Israel in the region and proving further that Israel’s disproportionate use of force 
has backfired on the Israeli state.   It can be argued that Israel did succeed in splitting Lebanon 
into two separate political camps.  One group constitutes a majority Shiite Muslim constituency 
suffering the most from the Israeli incursions; and a separate group made up of Sunni Muslims 
and Christians, living a more affluent lifestyle, and blaming Hezbollah for the Israeli attacks that 
have befallen the country. 
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CHAPTER III: IRAN 
 
Introduction 
 
While Hezbollah traces its origins back to Najaf, Iraq, it owes its creation to an Israeli 
operation in Southern Lebanon, intent on eliminating the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and installing a Christian-led, Israeli-friendly government in Beirut.  As Iran's war with 
Iraq weakened the more liberal elements in Iran, the religious clerics began to gain ground. The 
clerics believed that the only way to protect the Islamic republic from their adversaries was by 
exporting the Islamic revolution throughout the region. The two immediate geographic locations 
were Iraq and Lebanon.  Iraq however, was not an easy target to export to because of President 
Saddam Hussein and his secular Bath regime along with the Iran-Iraq war.  In this case, Iran 
lacked the personnel, channels and institutions that could operate within the country to spread the 
ideas of the revolution.   
The second location thought of as a prime location to export the ideas of the Islamic 
revolution was Lebanon.  Although the Amal movement, led by Musa al Sadr, had been 
established from the beginning under the slogan of putting an end to the suffering and 
deprivation of the Shia sect in Lebanon,  they did not recognize the Iranian concept of 'Wilayat-
e-Faqih' or Guardianship of the Scholar, a religious mode of government because of the multi-
religious makeup of Lebanon.  Iran, on the other hand, realized that the Amal movement, mainly 
composed of political activists, was not most efficient method of exporting the revolution.   
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In response to the Amal issue, Iran decided to create a new party based on the 
membership of religious clerics. Since Amal was not supportive of the Wilayat-e-Faqih, its 
members were classified as secularists and non-believers causing many of them to abandon the 
movement.  These individuals began to obtain a more religious orientation with backing from 
Iran which later led them to become members of Hezbollah.  The formation and activities of 
Hezbollah were also expedited with the 1982 Israeli invasion.  While it is apparent that Iran 
drove the activity behind the creation of Hezbollah, it is this author’s intention to show that the 
Israeli invasion created the impetus for Iranian influence in Lebanon, leading to the increase of 
Hezbollah’s power.  Although Hezbollah’s creation was fragmented and occurred over a longer 
period of time, for the purposes of this work, the formation date of the resistance movement will 
be referred to as 1982; this is for many reasons, primarily, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.109
Among modern day phenomena, Hezbollah, it can be argued, owes its rise to the steady 
yet wide scale decline of Arab civilization and its failure to meet the global challenges of living 
in a modern Western-dominated world.
   
110  Initially, Hezbollah was able to present itself as the 
key for making life better for hundreds of thousands of downtrodden Shiites throughout 
Lebanon.  It was not until recently that Hezbollah became the rallying point for millions of 
Muslims and Arabs throughout the region, as well as Christians in the Levant.  Although it was 
not a recognized group until the middle of the 1980s, Hezbollah had been operating for a number 
of years, primarily as an umbrella for different groups within the region.  Hezbollah’s first 
members were a number of fledgling volunteers consisting of disaffected Muslim men adhering 
to Shiite Islam as well as a number of Iranian style educated alims, otherwise known as “the 
knowledgeable ones.”111   
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As Hezbollah began to create its own agenda, Iran had a hand in coordinating and 
controlling Hezbollah activities, especially during the 1980s.  Iran’s influence was clear in the 
open letter to “The Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World”.  The document is purported to 
be written in Iran by a one-time member of the pro-Khatami reform movement in Iran.  The 
letter declared the world to be divided between the oppressed and the oppressors, mainly the U.S. 
and Israel as the oppressors.112
Moreover, the crucial fact is that Israel’s use of force can also be linked as part and parcel 
of the creation of Hezbollah.  Was it not for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) bases 
in Lebanon, and Israeli attempts at dislodging them, the fragile Shiite community living in the 
slums of Southern Lebanon may have not been given the necessary reasons to guard themselves 
against the incoming Israeli onslaught.   Secondarily,   was it not for Israel’s continued 
occupation of Southern Lebanon, the Shiite community would have had less of a reason to take 
up arms against the foreign invaders.  These facts, coupled with the mentality of the rulers in the 
region, that leaders do not represent the aspirations of their people, leads other powers to come 
about that will look after the needs of the people in a manner more conducive to their 
demands.
  Though Iran and Syria are widely given credit for Hezbollah’s 
rise, Iran has been the main forbearer of Hezbollah’s ideology.   
113
 
  Until the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt, this was systematically true throughout 
the region.  It is important to note that a number of Arab regimes are also going through 
transitions relating to the Arab Spring at this time. 
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Iranian Ideology 
 
For all practical purposes, modern Iranian-United States relations came about, due to the 
modern day United States, CIA engineered coupe of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 
1953.  Mossadegh was an ardent nationalist and opposed to the future of the United Kingdom’s 
long-term oil concessions, which in fact controlled Iran’s major natural resource.114
Mossadegh accepted to become the prime minister of Iran under the auspices that the 
Iranian parliament would end the oil concessions, which did not occur until 1951.  Mossadegh’s 
nationalization of Britain’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company showed him to be unreliable and a threat 
to Western interests, along with the fact that the Soviet Union was just around the corner.   The 
President of the United States at the time, Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a coup plan, and 
although previous attempts failed, on August 19, 1953, a CIA officer directed an intricate plan 
against Mossadegh and succeeded in removing him, marking U.S. foreign policy goals in Iran.   
This action not only succeeded in implanting the shah of Iran, it also created a generation of 
Iranians that grew up knowing that the CIA had installed him.
   
115
By the time John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in 1961, the United 
States was well on its way to changing Iran’s social fabric.  The United States argued that Iran’s 
land-tenure system was akin to “feudalism,” and that it was creating an environment that would 
allow for a communist revolution.  Under American pressure, the shah pushed for a so-called 
“White Revolution.”  This revolution brought about unexpected repercussions that both the 
United States and the Shah did not foresee.  The same backers that helped push out Mossedegh 
were not in favor of the changes to the land-tenure system.  Moreover, the Shah also proposed 
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the political emancipation of women, modeled after those proposed years earlier by Mustapha 
Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, angering the more conservative elements within Iran.  Riots broke out 
when it became obvious the election was rigged and a national referendum showed ninety-nine 
percent approval for the measure.   
The Iranian mainstream began to notice what the Shah and his reforms were creating.  
The modernization program was creating an ultra-wealthy status of elites within Iran, many of 
whom were part of the royal family.  These reforms brought about the ascendance of a relatively 
unknown cleric, Rohallah Khomeini.  Khomeini became so popular through his fiery sermons 
against the Shah in Iran that he was eventually sent into exile and forced from Iranian territory, 
first to Iraq and then to France.116
As Iran and the United States strengthened their alliance throughout the 1970’s, Israel 
was also able to create ties with the Shah.  This created a backlash not only amongst Iran’s Arab 
neighbors, but also amongst Iranians themselves.  Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo along 
with its relationships with the U.S. and Israel brought it much admiration from the U.S., so much 
so that Iran was considered to be an “Island of Stability” in relation to its neighbors.
 
117
Surprisingly, the Shah’s secret police, the SAVAK, notoriously known for their heavy-
handed tactics and for torturing opponents, were incapable of stopping the rising tide of 
dissention.  Adding fuel to the fire was Israel’s known relationship to the SAVAK.  Out of an 
increasing animosity between the Shah and the Arab states, Israel had helped train members of 
   
Nevertheless, the Shah’s crumbling regime began to show signs of fatigue after the Shah 
approved a publication highly critical of Khomeini.   
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the SAVAK.  In fact, this relationship helped influence increasingly popular enmity toward 
Israel.  Approximately, one year later, in January of 1979, the Shah was forced to flee Iran.  A 
short, two weeks later, Khomeini returned home from exile in Paris, France, pushing the 
revolution towards a theocratic-style of government.  Initially, while some secular elements were 
involved, they were quickly marginalized in the provisional government, leading the way for the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  To add to the changes, on November 4, a band of students took over 
the U.S. embassy, with tacit approval from the authorities, taking 52 hostages and punishing the 
Carter administration for allowing the deposed Shah safe haven for cancer treatment.118
In September of 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a war against Iran.  Saddam new that he 
needed to smash the new theocratic Iranian Republic or it would affect his ability to continue 
ruling his Shiite-majority country with a Sunni elite.   Given Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, Iraq also 
posed a threat to Israel.  Due to this, Iran seemed to be the lesser of two evils to Israel.  This led 
the U.S. to supply arms to Iraq while Israeli military strategists sought to secretly ship arms to 
Iran.  In July of 1981 an Argentinean cargo plane crashed en route to Iran. This crash later 
revealed reports of a $200 million arms deal between Israel and Iran.
 
119  As alliances began to 
shift, Israel would later regret sending weapons to Iran and eventually after the fall of Saddam, 
Iran would become Israel’s greatest threat. 120
Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran increasingly yearned for a base in 
the Arab world.  It was finally able to assist in creating the militant, and later political, Hezbollah 
movement in Lebanon.  Iran’s connection within Lebanon became the marginalized Shiite 
population working against Israeli occupation.  One year later, Hezbollah was reported to have 
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planned and participated in a massive bombing that damaged the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 
over 60 people.  Only six months later, a Hezbollah truck bomb struck a U.S. Marine barracks in 
Beirut, killing 241 United States’ Marines.  These actions were the precursors to the beginning of 
modern day Hezbollah and what has become a formidable political and military force in the 
region. 
Following the death of the Ayatollah Khomenie in 1989, Iran’s religious elite began to 
pursue a different path in terms of the country’s foreign policy.  The previous few years had been 
very volatile and they looked for a more practical and less aggressive foreign policy.  The 
leadership began to limit its support of Islamic movements.  For example, the religious clerics 
adopted a hands-off approach to the Chechen movement for independence from Russia.  They 
also did the same when Azerbaijan fell into conflict as well.  They realized that they could not 
alienate their Russian neighbors or those from smaller republics with whom they relied on 
politically, economically and otherwise.   
One area of the world they have not chosen to ignore is Israel.  Since Hezbollah’s 
founding, much support has been offered by the religious clerics in Iran.  These same clerics 
have asked their congregations to donate money to their networks so that they can funnel it to 
clerics in Lebanon and continue supporting Hezbollah.  This support has led to the rapid growth 
of Hezbollah and allowed them the ability to continue their resistance efforts in Lebanon.121
Though Hezbollah disliked interference from the United States, it disliked the Soviet 
Union even more.  A cleansing took place in 1984 and 1985 that eliminated hundreds of 
members that overtly supported communist ideology.  At the time, the view was that at least the 
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United States believed in God; moreover it accepted Islam as a religion.  On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union had repressed any belief in God since the Communists came to power. The Soviet 
Union was viewed to be more dangerous than the United States.122
From the European side, the French were also viewed with disdain as they chose to 
support the Maronite Christian community from Lebanon’s inception.  This was done so that 
France could obtain a foothold in the region and drive a wedge between the inhabitants of 
Lebanon.  Even more troubling then French support for the Maronite community in Lebanon, the 
French were selling arms to Iraq.  Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, defending the Arab 
frontline from Persian hordes and even more importantly, Iran was a close aide to Hezbollah.  
This relegated France as an enemy of Hezbollah as well.   
 
Historically, the crusades involved the clash of two different political worlds, the 
Christian West and the Islamic East.  In the East, the crusade to liberate Jerusalem from the 
infidels, assisted in merging the Muslim world and causing it to coordinate army competencies 
and devote resources in military services, which left it stronger and even more forceful to the 
West.123   In the case of Hezbollah, the group was not interested in looking East, nor West.  
Hezbollah wanted to craft their own blend of ideology in the region and strengthen the Muslim 
world wherever they could.  In the Hezbollah worldview, compromising with the enemy is not a 
possibility.  The disintegration of the Islamic and Arab world after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire was the perceived effect of imperialism; in Hezbollah’s outlook, the whole structure 
required a rethink.  In practical terms, Hezbollah viewed itself as a power, resisting not only 
Israel but the super powers of the world as well.124  
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  Hezbollah’s main goal after its inception was the removal of Israel as it existed, not its 
destruction.  Hezbollah wanted to return Israel to a Muslim, Arab-dominated society where 
European Jews are welcomed to live as they have been for thousands of years.  What Hezbollah 
cannot accept is the current status quo, a European satellite state run by European Jews in 
Southwest Asia.  Opposite the fact that a large portion of the Western World views Israel’s 
existence as a permanent one in the region, the majority of those in the region, especially those 
following Hezbollah’s ideology, would argue that it is not the case.  Among Hezbollah’s goals is 
the unification of the Shiite masses in the region as well as those that would agree with its 
ideology.  This reasoning provides a strong reasoning for Hezbollah’s wide support base among 
the Christian and Sunni Muslim communities within Lebanon and throughout the region. 
In Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s popularity is unmatched and it is still not uncommon 
to see a family of 10 children or more wanting to assist or join Hezbollah.  Socially speaking, the 
majority of Hezbollah members are not living in the swanky downtown districts of Sunni 
Muslim-dominated Beirut, but rather, in the slums of South Lebanon.   The unification of such a 
community has provided them with an opening to build up their support in Lebanon and in 
resisting further Israeli efforts in the region.   The organization has almost always been 
comprised of learned clerics or alims styled after the Iranian revolution and Shiite youth.  The 
external support base of Sunni Muslims and Arab and non Arab Christians has enabled the group 
to have many friends to turn to in times of peace as well as crises.   
The women of Hezbollah are also a critical element in that they are entrusted with taking 
care of the wounded, grooming intellectuals, fathering future fighters, lawyers among others for 
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the movement and learning how to fight, should it become a necessity.  These women are 
considered the backbone of Hezbollah activities, as the organization knows that without the 
support of the mothers, sisters and wives of the community, they can have no future in Lebanon. 
Children on the other hand, play no role in Hezbollah’s activities.125
 
   
The Hawala System 
 
Hezbollah has been well-funded by Iran and Syria as well as other groups and individuals 
for many years.  The bulk of this support is known to come from Iran.  While it is generally 
known where the money flows from, it is particularly interesting to see how the money is 
received. A form of Islamic economics is at play and exists in approximately forty-five Muslim 
countries as well as a number of other countries throughout the world, a banking system parallel 
to that of the secular banking system, where depositors expect a certain amount of interest on 
their investment.126
A financial system that has gone through scrutiny since the events of September 11, 2001 
is known as Hawala.  Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system.  It exists and 
operates outside of or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels.  It was developed in 
India before the introduction of Western banking practices and is currently a major remittance 
system used around the world.
  This parallel system plays a central role in funding for Hezbollah. One of 
the main pipelines that serve to provide funds to Hezbollah is the Hawala system 
127   In the U.S., it is known as the Informal Funds Banking 
System (IFTS).  In the Islamic world, Hawala is known by different names but performs the 
same function.  In the majority of Muslim countries, it is referred to as Hawala, in Arabic this 
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refers to “someone who transfers.”128  For example, in Bangladesh it is known as Hundi, Padala 
in the Philippines, in Thailand as Foe Kuan and in China as Fei Chien, Feiqian or “money that 
flies.”129
The key element that the Hawala system depends on to work properly is that it must rely 
on trust.  In terms of ease, it is much less expensive than using a bank or any financial institution.  
It works very simply and is akin to a Western Union service.  For example, if an organization or 
an individual wanted to send funds to Hezbollah, they would provide the monies to a trusted 
person and ask them to deliver the funds to someone else.  Its simplicity is what makes it so 
difficult to eliminate.   In return, you or someone you know will do the same for another party 
and they will receive a commission or favor in return.  As long as all parties have trust, the 
money will be delivered and no official exchange will be known of in the financial system.  In 
these communities, it is very harmful if one were not to come through on a promise to provide a 
Hawala service.  This system is also based on regional and familial relationships, making it very 
difficult and dishonorable if one were to fail on their promise, specifically if the funds are meant 
for Hezbollah.
   
130
The primary reasons for using this type of service are: cost effectiveness, efficiency, 
reliability and other various understandings. First, cost effectiveness, where a number of factors 
come into play such as closer exchange rates and lower overhead among others.  Second, the 
Hawala system is very efficient, it takes at most, one to two days and holidays, or weekends; any 
time distractions are limited.  Third, reliability, when dealing with international transactions; 
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banks require extensive information and the money is sent from one bank to another until 
reaching its final destination which can sometimes lead to interruptions.  
Another reason is a lack of bureaucracy.   You are not required to have documentation, 
receipts or personal information of any kind.  A lack of paperwork is an additional reason.  No 
paperwork is required to send the money and this means it cannot be tracked to any one person 
very easily.  Finally, tax evasion, while the Hawala system is not made for individuals to evade 
paying taxes to their respective governments, there are many simple and high tech methods 
involving Hawala that allow individuals to limit the amount of taxes that they do pay.131
This time honored tradition has received negative attention in the media because 
criminals have used this tool to transfer funds around the world by using individuals that do not 
know the real purposes behind their Hawala.  On the other hand, this system has existed for 
hundreds of years and millions of people use it around the world for good and with positive 
results.
 
132  In the case of Hezbollah, Hawala entails an “Mhawel,” pronounced m-howel, in one 
country and another Mhawel in another country.  Through this system, money never moves out 
of the country. The Mhawel, located in country A simply places a phone call or faxes in the 
money transaction to a known Mhawel in country B.  Party B provides the funds for the end 
result.133  Iran provides Hezbollah funds through a number of methods.  Money can be sent in a 
variety of forms including:  invoice manipulation, trade diversion, illegal use of online gifts cards 
as well as a number of schemes concocted to send funds to Hezbollah.134
One main issue is that both Mhawels must have the financial resources in order to be able 
to provide the funds transfer to the proposed recipient.  In Iran’s case, the method of choice is 
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simply sending someone across the border with millions in cash.  For example, on occasion, 
individuals are caught with large quantities of cash attempting to cross the border into Lebanon.   
 
U.S Fundraising Efforts 
 
Hezbollah’s actions in the United States have been mostly restricted to fundraising.  An 
example of this was shown in March 2005; Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, a Lebanese citizen 
living in a Detroit suburb was sentenced to 4 and a half years in prison for conspiracy to raise 
money for Hezbollah.  Kourani admitted to having meetings at his home for donations to 
Hezbollah.  According to the indictment unsealed by a federal grand jury in Michigan in January 
2004, Kourani was a "member, fighter, recruiter and fund-raiser for Hezbollah."135
A second instance of Hezbollah activity in the United States was exposed when two 
Charlotte, North Carolina brothers, Mohammad and Chawki Hammoud, were apprehended 
providing material support to Hezbollah through a cigarette smuggling ring that deliberately 
aimed at funding terrorist organizations.  The two brothers were part of a larger network in North 
America responsible for raising money and procuring dual-use technologies for Hezbollah.  
Items were purchased in both Canada and the United States, including goggles, naval equipment, 
global positioning systems, stun guns, nitrogen cutters and laser range finders.
 
136  In the United 
States, law enforcement agencies are investigating a number of criminal enterprises alleged to be 
funding Middle East terrorist groups including the stealing and reselling of baby formula, scams 
involving grocery coupons, food stamp fraud, welfare claims, credit cards and even unlicensed 
T-Shirts.138   
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A major sting operation conducted against Hezbollah in the U.S., code-named Operation 
Smokescreen took place beginning in 1995. The operation involved the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Sheriff's Office in Iredell County, North Carolina, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), the United States Department of State's Diplomatic Security 
Service (DSS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATF).  
Operation Smokescreen ended the fundraising operation and resulted in the arrest of a number of 
members of the Hezbollah cell in the U.S.    
The case brought against the North Carolina cell included "copyright violations, 
counterfeit violations, bank scams, identity theft, credit card fraud, tax evasion, and money 
laundering, among other charges filed.”137
The cell's leader, Mohammad Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years in federal prison.  
Hammoud's older brother, Shawqi Youssef, was also charged and received a prison sentence of 
  Charges also included "material support to a terrorist 
organization.  Federal courts estimated the cell collected a total of $8 million, funneled through 
some 500 various bank accounts leading to a large profit.  With these funds, the Hezbollah cell 
were able to purchase and ship "surveying equipment, Global Positioning Systems, night vision 
goggles and scopes, metal detection equipment, aircraft analysis and design software, military 
compasses, video equipment, binoculars, naval equipment, ultrasonic dog repellers, laser range 
finders, zoom lenses, computer equipment (laptops, high-speed modems; processors, joysticks, 
plotters, scanners, and printers), digital cameras, stun guns, handheld radios and receivers, 
cellular telephones, mining, drilling and blasting equipment," and nitrogen cutters to Hezbollah 
operatives in Southwest Asia.   
57 
 
70 years.138
In a separate but highly significant event, in September 2002, an Israeli military court 
indicted a Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli army, part of a ten-member gang, of spying for 
Hezbollah.  The officer, who purportedly lost part of his eyesight fighting Hezbollah guerillas, 
passed top secret information to Hezbollah operatives in return for cash, heroin and hashish.139  
Hezbollah is also alleged to have fundraising operations from the drug and diamond trades in 
various parts of the Middle East, South America and West Africa. 
  Similar cases were later uncovered in Asheville, North Carolina, and Louisville, 
Kentucky.   The operation led to the creation of the North Carolina Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF).   
 
Hezbollah Goals 
 
Independent communication has been a major goal for Hezbollah.  It is important enough 
that Hezbollah controls its own parallel communication network from the Beirut International 
airport.   Since its initiation, Hezbollah has spent large sums pushing its world view through a 
number of outlets. The group’s weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge), was launched on June 
13, 1984, and was followed by the weeklies Al Bilad, Al Wahda, El Ismailya, and the monthly Al 
Sabil.140  Hezbollah’s radio station, Al-Nour (the Light), was founded during Hezballah’s conflict 
with Amal, another Shiite group vying for support in 1988, when a group of young Hezbollah 
fighters spontaneously began broadcasting news of the clashes.    
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Hezballah’s Internet presence first came into effect in 1996. The Central internet site 
(Hizbollah.org), is the group’s official homepage, and is available in both English and Arabic.139  
Hezbollah also maintains three other major websites, all of which are in Arabic and English: 
http://www.nasrollah.net, the official homepage of the group’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 
http://www.moqawama.net, known as the “Islamic Resistance Support Association,” and which 
describes the group’s attacks on Israeli targets; and http://www.manartv.com.lb, an information 
site that is the homepage of al-Manar Television channel.140   Live footage of Hezbollah’s 
operations appeared through the Hezbollah television station, al-Manar, for the first time in 1986 
with coverage of the invasion of the Israeli-occupied Sujud.141
According to Hezbollah’s deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem, the camera became an 
essential element in all resistance operations after the first operation was broadcast.  The 
establishment of al-Manar followed shortly thereafter; its first broadcast was Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s funeral in June 1989.
  These stations have been able to 
transmit photos of dead and wounded Israeli soldiers deep within Israeli territory, creating ripple 
effects within Israeli society. 
142  Hezbollah also receives and spends funds on humanitarian 
and construction causes in Lebanon.  Hezbollah understands that it has been able to legitimize its 
organization through humanitarian assistance which will lead to more favorable political 
support.143
Hezbollah has also learned how to deal with large-scale relief efforts such as:  
construction equipment, building material and plenty of manpower. While waiting for 
international aid to arrive during the last conflict, Hezbollah was able to finish much of the work 
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needed beforehand.   For example, the television station al-Manar reported that hundreds of pre-
fabricated houses were already being delivered around Tyre, Lebanon just after the war.144  
Moreover, single payments of up to $12,000 have been given to those who can show that their 
homes were destroyed during the conflict with new U.S. currency.145
In an effort to parlay Hezbollah’s psychological operation well beyond television stations 
and health clinics, Hezbollah has recently built its first theme park in Lebanon.  Visiting the 
“Tourist Landmark of Resistance,” a tour guide will welcome you emphasizing the fact that 
Hezbollah is the sole defender of Lebanon against Israel.
 
146  Hezbollah also emphasizes that their 
involvement in Southern Lebanon is a defensive one.  This park serves as part of Hezbollah’s 
successful psy-ops machine against Israel and those that regard it as a terrorist group.  Visitors 
are led past a large opening filled with Israeli helmets, shell casings and tanks.147   Other park 
features include panels with details of the Israeli military machine as well as a map showing 
places in Israel such as the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona.  Children can pretend 
to aim anti-aircraft guns or jump on overturned armored personnel carriers.148
Among other attractions at the park is a Hezbollah bunker used during the 2006 war, 
offering visitors a view into the life of Hezbollah fighters.  Finally, there is a park called Martyrs 
Hill, featuring a garden decorated with guns and missiles.  It is reported that MIT Professor, 
Noam Chomsky as well as other dignitaries attended the grand opening and up to three hundred-
thousand people visited the theme park in the first ten weeks of its opening.
   
149   This park site 
once served as an important base for Hezbollah fighters and serves as an important reminder of 
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Israel’s force in the region.  It is purported that Hezbollah has plans to expand the park's appeal 
by adding swimming areas, playgrounds, a number of hotels and camping facilities.150
While Hezbollah has learned that the youth are the future of the movement, they have not 
stopped at theme parks; Iran’s patronage has provided them with funds to go even further.  In 
order to popularize Hezbollah among the youth of the region, Hezbollah created a popular video 
game in 2003, known as “Special Force”.  Created similarly to a number of U.S. styled games 
such as “Delta Force” and “Counter Strike,” where Arabs are often characterized as the “bad 
guys;” Hezbollah has produced this game with Israel portrayed as the enemy.
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   The original 
version’s popularity sparked considerable attention and lead to a second version in 2007 based 
off of the 2006 war with Israel.  
 
Hezbollah: The New Strategy 
 
During the initial stages, Hezbollah began to take part in suicide bombings and the 
kidnapping of journalists, reporters and others.  Hezbollah also planned and succeeded in the 
suicide attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut and a U.S. Marine barracks in 1983.152  The 
weapons provided to Hezbollah to commit such attacks have historically gone through Syria.  
For example, on December 26, 2003, an earthquake leveled much of the city of Bam, in 
Southeastern Iran, killing thousands.  Transport planes carrying necessary aid poured in from all 
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over, including Syria.  According to intelligence reports from Israel, certain planes returned to 
Syria carrying weapons, including long-range Zelzal missiles.153
In part, Iran’s influence has assisted Hezbollah to go from a small scale resistance 
organization to a well organized group with political power.  For example, lacking Iranian 
assistance, Hezbollah would not have been able to carry out the attacks directed at Jewish targets 
in Buenos Aires, retaliatory attacks, argued to have been carried out at soft targets because 
Hezbollah was unable to strike directly at Israel at the time.  In 1992, a suicide bomber attacked 
the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and injuring more than 200 civilians
 
154
Also, it is argued that an attack so far from Lebanon could not be carried out by 
Hezbollah alone.  It would need the help of a state actor to obtain weapons and logistical 
information.   Some have even gone so far as to say it was planned and carried out by Iran with 
the help of Hezbollah operatives.  Syria and Iran also provide satellite communications and 
infantry weapons, including Semtex plastic explosives, modern Russian-made antitank weapons, 
and the training required to use them.
  In 1994, 
a truck bomb destroyed the Jewish community center killing 85 and injuring over 100 civilians.  
Argentine prosecutors later held Iran responsible for ordering the attack and Hezbollah for 
carrying it out.  
155  Russian-made antitank missiles have damaged or 
destroyed Israeli vehicles, including the Merkava, with a 20 percent success rate.156  Hezbollah 
fighters routinely use tunnels to emerge from underground locations to fire shoulder-held 
antitank missiles.  These fighters range from a regular army of 2,000 to 4,000, often aided by a 
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larger circle of irregulars who provide logistics and weapons storage in houses and civilian 
buildings.157
Hezbollah revolutionary forces maintain locations within civilian areas making it difficult 
to fight without Israel having to occupy or bomb civilian areas.  On orders, fighters emerge to 
use launchers and fire missiles before returning to underground bunkers.  The guerilla numbers 
are relatively small compared to the size of the Israeli Army. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
has assisted Hezbollah with special units for intelligence, antitank warfare, engineering, 
communications, explosives and rocket launching.  The guard has also taught Hezbollah how to 
make “improvised explosive devices as well as how to aim rockets,” and according to the 
Israelis, they were also taught how to fire the C-802 ground-to-ship missile.
   
158
According to intelligence officers in Washington D.C, Iranian officers have made 
multiple trips to Lebanon to train Hezbollah fighters to aim and fire medium-range missiles, such 
as the Fajr-5.
 
159  Hezbollah has also obtained antitank weapons from Russia.160
Despite the fact that large Arab armies have been defeated repeatedly, Hezbollah, with 
Iranian help has been able to eliminate the myth that the Israeli army is unbeatable.  Hezbollah is 
much better equipped with sophisticated weaponry and its soldiers are well trained to fight a 
standing army.  They have also been trained to be patient and attuned to gathering intelligence, 
learning guerrilla warfare yet remaining respectful of Israeli firepower and mobility.
  One of these 
weapons is the dual usage RPG-29, an antitank weapon and an anti-personnel round.  This 
weapon is of high concern for Israel because it is dangerous for the Israeli made Merkava tank. 
161 
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New Leadership 
 
Hezbollah’s success can be related to a number of factors coming from purely domestic 
politics while others from a longer-term strategic importance.  Hezbollah has understood that it 
cannot rely on military victories alone.162
To mix in with the local population, Hezbollah commanders travel in unmarked vehicles 
without bodyguards and wear no obvious markings to differentiate them from the locals.  
Hezbollah began its tactics by setting up roadside bombs detonated by cables, which the Israelis 
learned to defeat with wire-cutting attachments added to their vehicles.  Hezbollah then upgraded 
and began later using radio detonators, then were pushed to use cell phone detonators, then a 
double system of cell phones, and then a photocell detonator much like that used to open garage 
doors.  More recently, Hezbollah has begun using pressure detonators dug into roads causing 
havoc on Israeli vehicles.  Hezbollah bunkers have gone from holes in the grounds to concrete 
storerooms with ladders, emergency openings, escape routes and sophisticated technology.
  To correct this, a major change occurred in 1992, 
when Sheik Hassan Nasrallah took the helm of the organization and turned it into a system with 
three regional commands, each with its own military autonomy.  Hezbollah set up separate and 
autonomous units that live among civilians with local reserve forces.  
163
Certain authors have pushed the idea that Hezbollah is little more than an extremist group 
with fundamentalist ideals.  In agreement with this range of arguments, Podhoretz argues that 
there is no misunderstanding.  The Islamofacists, referring to Hezbollah, are not just out to 
murder as many Americans as possible, they are also dedicated to the obliteration of the 
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freedoms and principles that America is based upon.164
On the other end of the argument, Southern notes: “Before 1100, I have found only one 
mention of the name Mahomet in medieval literature outside Spain and Southern Italy.  But from 
the year 1120 every one in the West had some picture of what Islam meant, and who Mahomet 
was.  The picture was brilliantly clear, but it was not knowledge…. Its authors luxuriated in 
ignorance of triumphant imagination.”
   When looked into on a less superficial 
level, Hezbollah argues that it does not want any foreign intervention in any part of Lebanon and 
it is willing to fight for this, politically and otherwise. 
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  This provides a basic example of the 
misunderstandings related to a better comprehension of Hezbollah and the ability to understand 
and negotiate with them. 
Changing Alliances 
 
A previous article explaining the then upcoming parliamentary election in June regarding 
the main Armenian political party in Lebanon explains the new political realities in Lebanon 
perfectly.  The vote of the 150,000-strong Armenian community was looking to sway the 
outcome of the bitter race between the pro-Western government and the opposition led by 
Hezbollah.  All of the major parties are fighting for votes but some have already made up their 
minds.  Out of the three Armenian parties, Tashnak enjoys the most support and it has already 
made its choice, joining the Hezbollah-led alliance.166 
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Voting for the opposition is also an unusual phenomenon for the Armenian community, 
which has traditionally voted for the government.  Like all of Lebanon’s confessional political 
system, the Armenian community has an assigned number of seats in parliament.  For many 
years, these seven seats have always been won by the Tashnak Party.   This changed in 2000 
when a newly backed Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri redrew the electoral map of Beirut, dividing 
the Armenian neighborhoods and placing them in districts with Sunni Muslim majorities.  The 
law change resulted in the Tashnak party losing seats to lesser-known Armenians who supported 
the Sunni Muslim prime minister.  
  Since Tashnak was campaigning under the opposition umbrella, winning seats for 
themselves would mean helping Hezbollah to win as well.   Many of those in the Christian 
constituency argue that they have much in common with the Muslim Shiite movement.   The 
ethnic Armenians living in Lebanon are also against oppression, they dealt with oppression 
during the fall of the Ottoman Empire when they were forced to leave.   The Armenian 
community in Lebanon has been generally hesitant about the change in the political arena but 
understand that it needs to continue its role as a voting force in Lebanon.  Hezbollah has been 
able to keep stability in their region and protects the Christian community as well; they 
remember this when voting.  Were it not for Hezbollah, the Israeli’s would have remained in 
Lebanon for far longer than they did.167
The local constituents of Hezbollah disagree with the U.S. and the other states that have 
declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization.  While the U.S. has generally declared Hezbollah a 
   The Christians in this community fully understand this 
fact.   
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terrorist organization along the line of al-Qaeda, many would argue that does not take into 
account, the schools, hospitals and other functions that Hezbollah provides for the poor of 
Lebanon that have been forgotten by the government in Beirut. 
 
Remarks 
 
Hezbollah was created as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  Future 
Israeli bombardments, along with American boots in Lebanon, have caused Hezbollah to harden 
its grasp on a few towns in the south of Lebanon with a bunch of ragtag 20 something recruits.  
Currently, Hezbollah, along with the buildup of its military arsenal, has managed to develop into 
a relevant force with television, radio stations, newspapers, and a number of seats in the 
Lebanese parliament.   
As a result of its defensive territorial acquisition, Hezbollah has become an influential 
non-state actor in the region and enjoys much more independent activity than in the past.  Syria, 
which once had an important say in the activities of the organization, has been marginalized and 
the government is currently fighting for its life with violent crackdowns against a mix of what 
seems to be peaceful protesters and religious antagonists.  Current events seem to show that Iran 
is now much more in control.168
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CHAPTER IV: SYRIA 
 
Introduction 
 
For better or worse, stability in modern-day Syria began in the 1970s through an internal 
coup that brought the military to the forefront of power.   Hafez al-Assad, an Air Force pilot by 
training, managed to uproot the historical political base in Syria and create an authoritarian 
regime based on two pillars.  These two pillars consisted of party strength and above all, military 
strength.  By placing a number of his associates in power positions, he began to change the face 
of a historically Sunni Muslim dominated power structure in Syria.  Further complicating the 
issue was Syria’s ethnic makeup.   
Kasmieh argues that Syria’s Socio-religious cultural fragmentation made it quite 
challenging.  Syria is made up of religious and ethnic communities ranging from the Ismailis to 
Alawi sects, Sunnis, Greek Orthodox Christians, Druze and a small Jewish population.169 In 
order for Assad to maintain control, he used his pan Arab, nationalist platform to unite the 
minorities in backing his power base.  In terms of ethnicities, Arabs make up only a portion of 
Syrian population, Carcassians, Assyrians, Kurds, Armenians, Turkoman, and a sizeable 
Palestinian-Arab population are all part of the Syrian makeup.170
Hafez al Assad was able to unite the country under his firm grip and in terms of 
unification of government, create a Syrian renaissance that would last numerous American 
 This made it all the more 
difficult for the Assad regime to maintain control without stirring the fires of division within the 
country. 
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presidents and many wars with the State of Israel.  For example, the 1973 Egyptian-Syrian 
offensive came as a shock to the Israelis because cohesion of the Syrian government apparatus 
had obviously changed.   Chomsky states that Syria’s newfound cohesion was proven in the 1973 
offensive against Israel.  Government and military apparatuses were acting in unison without the 
usual disagreements that had besieged the Syrian government for so many years.171
The most serious threat to the Baath or renaissance party came from religious 
fundamentalism.  The Muslim Brotherhood was a threat to the governments of virtually all Arab 
states and was a direct threat to the Syrian government as it had a major stronghold in the town 
of Hama.  The brotherhood committed militant attacks against the government in urban 
populated centers throughout Syria.  Interestingly, the movement failed to take root outside 
urban areas and among the majority of Sunni Muslims.  While the government had acted with 
force in retaliation for attacks in the past, the turning point came in 1982.  Following an attack in 
the city of Hama where a number of Alawite cadets were killed, the army used brute force to 
quell the movement.   
 The most 
serious threat to the stability of the then Syrian government was not Israel, but the Muslim 
brotherhood.   
After a night of fighting, regular army units were sent into Hama with a demand of 
general surrender for the entire city.  Those who did not surrender were killed.  The military 
units were ordered to follow a “scorched earth” policy where everything that could be useful to 
the enemy was destroyed.172  Subsequently, thousands of civilians were killed with estimates 
ranging from 10,000 to 40,000.  Until the recent protests of the Arab Spring, anti government 
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religious movements in Syria have been few and far between.  It is almost impossible to mention 
Syria without mentioning Lebanon.  Although Syria and parts of Lebanon have never accepted 
the disintegration of greater Syria, Hafez al-Assad wanted to create a weak and compliant 
Lebanon dependent on Syria for a number of its political, economic and military needs. 
Israel’s military and political strategy on the other hand, was to attempt to insulate 
Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli conflict through a separate peace treaty with the Gemayel 
government as had been done with Egypt many years ago under the leadership of Sadat.  The 
Lebanese civil war necessitated Syrian involvement in Lebanon and intervention amongst the 
PLO factions as well as buffering Israeli interests.  Concurrently, American forces were stationed 
in Lebanon in a bid to counter Syrian efforts in the country.  For better or for worse, U.S. 
political will to remain in Lebanon was not strong enough after two bombings against American 
targets killed scores of American soldiers.  These events led to the Taif Accord which created 
stability in Lebanon, a cold temporary peace with Israel, and stopped the radicalization of 
Lebanon by Palestinian fighters. 
  During this time, President Assad’s son Basel was being groomed to take power.   
However, he was killed in a car accident in 1994, forcing President Hafez al-Assad to recall his 
younger son Bashar, an ophthalmologist living in the United Kingdom.   Bashar was trained in 
the military and diplomatic core and within six short years, given the rank of colonel.  Bashar 
was introduced to the ruling elite and connected to his father’s backers.  Bashar had taken on 
many public roles as well as including a corruption campaign, among others.173  Upon his 
father’s death in 2000, Bashar had not yet been given the necessary post to assume leadership 
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and was not old enough to take power.  Despite these blocks, laws were changed and within a 
mere forty-eight hours, he ascended to the presidency.  
As the mourning period for his father came to an end, Bashar was elected president of the 
Syrian Arab Republic with a vast majority of the vote, 97.29 percent.174
Because of this, many Syrians feel that they are in geographic competition with Israel for 
Syria Proper and this would be a major component of Bashar’s leadership.
  Bashar would now have 
to focus on the foreign policy left to him by his father, learning from the direct military 
confrontations of 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982 between Syria and Israel.  His father had the 
convenience of gravitating toward the Soviet Union for backing; now though, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics was no more and he would have to gravitate more towards regional 
actors for support and to balance his strategic parity with Israel.   
175  Leverrit has said 
that by solidifying Syria’s role in the region after Hafez al-Assad’s death, Bashar al-Assad took 
control of the power structure and has managed to create a very delicate impetus for change.  
While juggling the issues of Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, relations with Washington, D.C, 
and the regional balance, he has managed to continue the slow process of change without 
upsetting the old guard.176  Specifically, Bashar al-Assad’s foreign policy has differed somewhat 
from that of his father, further allowing Syria to change with the necessity of an ever-changing 
political atmosphere.177  Long also states that Syria sees itself as the heart of the Arab world and 
that by following the 2000 political succession from Hafiz al-Assad to President Bashar, Syrian 
foreign policy continues to focus on the stand-off with Israel.   
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In the mean time, Syria has warmed relations with many of its neighbors to shore up 
support in case of any future dealings with its Israeli neighbor.178  In 2004, problems again began 
to erupt for the new Syrian President after the extension of the new Lebanese President, Emile 
Lahood.  A galvanization of ant-Syrian forces began to be heard in Lebanon with calls for Syria 
to withdraw militarily to the Bekaa valley.  Although Assad tried to improve his relations by 
withdrawing troops from central Lebanon, a turn for the worst took place with the assassination 
of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik al-Hariri in Beirut.  Despite attempts, Syria was 
unable to bring about support to stay in Lebanon.179
 Notwithstanding widespread thinking that the new Assad would be able to get through 
this impasse, the last Syrian troops exited from Lebanon in April of 2005, almost 30 years since 
they were first requested to enter.  In retrospect, even with the troop withdrawal, it is not 
concluded that Syria is out of the picture in Lebanon, as many Lebanese still support Syria, 
including the larger Shiite community and well as those in the Sunni and Christian communities. 
  
Syrian Foreign Policy 
 
The United States State Department lists Hezbollah as a major sponsor of terrorism.   The 
Montoneros in Argentina, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the recently defeated Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka are all groups which have attracted thousands of followers, despite their having been 
responsible for many well-publicized militant operations.180  Syria views such groups and 
Hezbollah as a means of foreign policy.  This explains the Israeli view that Syria’s relationship 
to non-state actors, primarily Hezbollah, is a primary threat due to the location of Hezbollah 
forces in Lebanon.   
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Despite Iran’s initial activities backing Iran, Syria also played a very important role in the 
expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Without Syria being available as a passageway, it would 
have been improbable that Hezbollah could be turned into an autonomous political, social and 
military force within Lebanon.  As mentioned previously, an Iranian military force was sent into 
Lebanon via Syria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 181
Syria uses Hezbollah as a deterrent not only against Israeli invasion but also as a balance 
between those anti-Syrian Forces within Lebanon. Syria’s involvement with Hezbollah has been 
a counter to Israel in the region.   The Hezbollah card allows Syria some discretion in deterring a 
full scale Israeli invasion as well.  Syria’s support for Hezbollah, other than ideological, has been 
through the build-up of arms in the region and pushing for a closer weapons balance.
  While the Iranians 
participated in the training of Hezbollah, Hezbollah’s leadership managed to disseminate its 
ideas within the Lebanese Shiite community.  In turn, the Iranians benefited from their new 
strategic alliance with Syria in Lebanon.  While these factors point out the importance of Syria’s 
role in allowing Iranian influence within Lebanon, it is this author’s opinion that the Israeli 
invasion of 1982 not only created the impetus for but also served as a deciding factor the creation 
of Hezbollah.  
182  In terms 
of ideology, when the United States created its military buildup for an attack on Iraq, Syria 
rejected the United States condemnation of terrorism without distinguishing between Liberation 
movements and al-Qaeda.183  Assad has hoped that his defiance of Washington, D.C would 
strengthen him at home and once a new administration came in, the United States would soften 
its policy towards Syria.184  This turned out to be true under the Obama administration but the 
Arab spring would bring problems of its own. 
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It is said that politics makes strange bedfellows.  The Syrian-Iranian relationship is a 
peculiar relation at best.  Despite Syria’s secularist views and Iran’s religious theocracy, the two 
have managed to maintain relations in a very positive manner. Beginning with Syria’s support of 
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, Syria began supporting Iran against neighboring Arab states.  Since that 
time, Syria’s relationship with Iran has solidified and is considered one of the most solid in the 
region not only politically, but economically as well.  During the 1980s, as the jointly backed 
Hezbollah organization began taking shape, both Syria and Iran found themselves even more 
connected in their foreign policy goals.  Hezbollah is viewed to be the crux of that relationship.  
Furthermore, Iran and Syria have signed a mutual defense agreement agreeing to defend each 
other in case of an attack by Israel or the United States.185
While Hezbollah defers to Syrian influence in Lebanon, their interests do not always 
overlap.  Hezbollah has and will continue to take Syria’s interests into consideration, although it 
only does so unless it jeopardizes its political support in Lebanon.
   
186
Syria has carefully considered its options and has learned from the 2006 Hezbollah-
Israeli conflict and has adapted its military strategy accordingly.  Syria has also long used 
Hezbollah as a form of asymmetric warfare against Israel.  As discussed earlier, Lebanon became 
a center of proxy war against Israel and the end result of this was the creation of Hezbollah.
  This in itself implies limits 
on Syria’s influence.  Hezbollah leaders also understand that Syria’s use for Hezbollah is very 
utilitarian and they are both aware that alliances of this nature may eventually become 
inconvenient for one party or the other.   
187  
As Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 due to pressure from Hezbollah, Syria 
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was also forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005 as a result of its perceived involvement in the 
assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri.  Neither of the withdrawals, though, 
put an end to competition for power in Lebanon.  As mentioned earlier, during the 2006 
Hezbollah-Israeli war, Israel pounded Lebanese sites, attempting to force the population to 
pressure the Lebanese government to restrain Hezbollah forces.  Hezbollah was able to withstand 
Israeli forces and continued to fight back.188
As Syria and Israel have competed for outside support, Israel has long received the 
support of the United States.  This support has included massive amounts of financial aid and 
military support.  On the Syrian side, Syria has received support from Iran.  It can be argued that 
by understanding the relationship between the United States and Israel, Syria understood that it 
would never be able to receive the same type of support from Iran due to the strength of the 
relationship as well as the technological limitations in comparison to the United States.  
Therefore, Syria needs to augment its ability and create its own support network with the 
creation of Hezbollah.  While the Soviet Union existed, Syria was able to replenish its weapons 
in a relatively short period of time.  After the fall of its Russian predecessor, the situation 
changed completely.
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The Next Hezbollah-Israeli Conflict? 
 
 
Syria has also continued to exploit Israeli fears with the asymmetric threat posed by 
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and against Israeli sites throughout the world.  During the 2006 
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Hezbollah-Israeli war, Hezbollah proved that it could withstand a heavy bombardment from 
Israeli forces and Syria proved that it could conduct a war by proxy without invoking a heavy-
handed response from Israeli forces onto its territory.190
It is also well known that any future war will include a list of the newest weaponry 
Hezbollah will have been resupplied with from Iran, coming in through Syria.  Syria has not only 
assisted Hezbollah in re-arming with more sophisticated weaponry, it has also assisted in 
incorporating techniques learned from the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war.  A senior Hezbollah 
official was quoted in Defense News regarding Hezbollah’s new activities, saying “we have 
subjected our guerillas to training and acquired needed weapons systems and developed new 
tactics to fight a more determined Israeli enemy… We also have as good tactical missiles as we 
did last time… with some additional surprises.”
  The chance of another war between 
Israel and Hezbollah is unknown but highly likely.  Israel is unlikely to allow Hezbollah to 
continue building up its arsenal without some type of targeted strike or massive invasion.  It 
cannot allow an enemy to grow so close to its northern border, especially since Egypt can no 
longer be guaranteed to cover the Southern flank of Israel, and Jordan has to walk a thin line 
with its citizenry engaging in massive protests on a semi-regular basis.   Israel has realized that it 
must also be better equipped to fight and execute wars in an asymmetrical context.   
191
 There have also been reports that Iran has transferred a number of missiles to Syrian 
territory in case of an Israeli attack.  These missiles in turn could be transferred to Hezbollah and 
used to strike virtually anywhere within Israeli territory.  Weapons such as the medium range 
Shahab 3, the Russian made Scud C as well as the Scud B missiles.  Theses scud missiles bring 
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to light a very important issue.  If Hezbollah has been armed with them, it can seriously change 
the balance between Hezbollah and Israel.   
 
 
Weapons 
 
Scud missiles were originally created by the Soviet Union based off of the German V2 
rocket design manufactured by the Nazis during the remaining days of Nazi Germany.  The 
Soviets were able to simplify the engines of the missiles, making the missile much more efficient 
for battle.  In the mid 1980s Iran acquired a number of Scud missiles from North Korea.  Similar 
missiles had been acquired by North Korea from Egypt in the early 1980s.    The Koreans had 
learned to manufacture their own versions of the Scud missiles, known as the Hwasong-5 and 
Hwasong-6 and were exporting them to Iran and Syria.  In Iran, these missiles are known as the 
Shahab-1, the Shahab-2 and the Shahab-3.192
As mentioned earlier, it has been reported that Syria has passed Scud missiles to 
Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon.  These reports, if true, can truly tilt the balance in the region.  
On December 5, 1989, Iraq launched a 25 meter-long rocket with the intention of being able to 
put a satellite into space.  This “Scud” missile was actually five Iraqi-version Scuds bundled 
together.
  Currently, both Iran and Syria are believed to be 
manufacturing their own versions of Scud missiles.  Although their accuracy is questionable, 
they can cause damage and produce large amounts of fear among troops and civilians.  The range 
is roughly 500 kilometers at best and the accuracy is very limited.   
193    The vehicle had a SCUD-based liquid propulsion system consisting of four or five 
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bundled and modified SCUD missiles.   The second stage also consisted of a SCUD missile, 
while the third stage had an SA-2 motor.  
Only the first stage was able to function, and it is possible that the second and third stages 
were not operational and this launce was merely an initial test.  The system was called al-Abid, 
and was meant as a test to see if this type of missile launch would be successful in putting 
satellites into orbit.  These satellites could be used for reconnaissance as well as communication 
and control in low orbit.  
The mere implication for Hezbollah with this type of missile technology in its hands 
shows how far Syria is willing to go to support Hezbollah and counter Israeli hegemony in the 
region.  Israel’s main concern regarding the missiles transferred by Syria to Hezbollah focuses 
on the M600 missile.  This missile, a clone of Iran’s Fateh-110, is manufactured in Syria, 
extremely accurate and has a range of 250 kilometers and can carry a 500-kilogram warhead.194
 
   
If the reports are true that Hezbollah has indeed received Scud missiles and if these missiles are 
placed in Southern Lebanon, they would be able to strike any city within Israel, drastically 
changing the balance in the region and creating a high level of risk for Israel when and how it 
chooses to deal with Hezbollah. 
Syrian Regime and 2011 Protests 
 
The protest movement begun by Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, on December 17, 2010 
created a wave of protests throughout the Arab world, ending first with the departure of Zein al-
Din Ben Ali, the former dictator of Tunisia.  The second stop of this protest movement came to 
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Egypt and lasted less than one month. This movement was successful in bringing down the long 
held reign of Egypt’s dictator Mohammad Gamal Mubarak.  As the movement spread to 
practically all parts of the Arab world, it slowly came to Syria after repeated calls from the 
Syrian government that it was immune to protest movements sweeping the region for a number 
of reasons, one of which is the anti-Zionist and or anti-Israel foreign policy it holds.  The regime 
has a history of promoting itself as the bulwark against Israeli hegemony in the region.  At first, 
these speeches seemed to work but slowly the protests in Syria began to take shape.   
While the protests were modest in the beginning, January 26 proved to be a turning point.  
Hasan Ali Akleh, an Arab from the Syrian town of Al-Hasakah, committed the act of self-
immolation, just as had been done in Tunisia to protest the actions of the Syrian regime.  Merely 
48 hours later, demonstrations began to spread to other Syrian towns including AlRaggah.195  
Initially, wider calls for protests on social media sites, such as Facebook attracted wide attention 
by Arabs from outside of Syria though internally, there was little activity.   On February 5, a few 
hundred demonstrators in al-Hasakah, participated in calling for the removal of the regime.  This 
protest was quickly subdued with dozens of protesters being arrested.196  By mid March, the 
protest became more frequent with multiple demonstrations taking place across multiple Syrian 
cities.  The protests grew from hundreds to thousands in, Deir ez-Zor, Daraa, al-Hasakah, and 
Hama, the site of the 1982 Hama massacre where Syrian journalist Subhi Hadidi has written that 
soldiers killed “30,000 or 40,000 of the city's citizens and expelled 100,000 and in addition, 
15,000 missing whose bodies were never found.”197   
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After online calls for a Friday protest, thousands of protesters demanding an end to 
government corruption began protesting in cities across Syria.   The protesters were quickly met 
with a violent crackdown by state security forces, known as the Mukhabarat.  Many were beaten 
while others were arrested and sent to jails.  The city of Daraa in Southern Syria, near the 
Jordanian border, became the focal point of protests.   
Many government and Assad family-related buildings were torched including the Ba'ath 
party headquarters in Daraa, the courthouse, and Syriatel headquarters owned by Rami 
Makhloof, the infamous cousin of Bashar al-Assad.  Within 24 hours, protests began in Banyas, 
Jassem, Homs and Hama.198   The government began to cut off phone services and began 
holding journalists in the country, as well as limiting access to cities by setting up checkpoints in 
the streets.   By March 25, tens of thousands of protesters were taking to the streets around the 
country, including some in Aleppo and Damascus, Syria’s second and largest cities, respectively.  
Troops began opening fire on unarmed protestors according to many news reports.  Over 
100,000 protesters in Daraa drew a fierce reaction from the government.199
Reports suggest that over 20 protesters were killed initially.
 
200 There were reports that at 
least 20 people were killed in protests in Daraa, which drew over 100,000 people.  Acts of 
violence against the regime began to occur such as the knocking down of a Hafez al-Assad statue 
and a governor's home was set on fire.201
March 26 was the first day that the government showed that it was willing to make some 
concessions regarding protestor demands.  The regime released information that the emergency 
   Many of the protests began to show up on YouTube 
because the government began limiting foreign journalists and blocking internet sites. 
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laws set into place over 30 years before would be lifted, 200 political prisoners would be 
released and the entire government resigned.202  Just three days later, hundreds of thousands 
demonstrated in support of President al-Assad in, Aleppo, Damascus, al-Hasaka, Homs Hama 
and Tartous.203  Within 24 hours al-Assad continued to note a repeat of previous foreign 
dictators, that foreign conspirators were at fault for the uprising and that they were attempting to 
drive a wedge amongst Syria’s society, and therefore, the emergency put into place by his father, 
Hafez-al Assad, would not be lifted as previously confirmed and that it would be reviewed for 
further study.204
On April 1, thousands of Syrians citizens joined protesters in multiple cities around Syria. 
Security forces again opened fire killing dozens.
 
205 Further south, in a small city outside Daraa, a 
demonstrator was killed during a protest.  As the protests began to grow, international journalists 
began to pay more attention and started reporting more frequently on the protests. The regime in 
Syria began banning all foreign media and closed its borders. In what can be signs of desperation 
or attempts to hold off further protests, the Syrian government dropped a law barring teachers 
with niqabs from teaching students, granted citizenship to many of the country’s Kurdish 
minority, and closed a recently opened casino that was shut down many years before.206
On April 19, al-Assad signed the decrees for ending the state of emergency, abolishing 
the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), as well as permitting the right to peaceful 
demonstrations; however, permits from the government were necessary.  Despite these actions, 
the protests continued to grow, and by April 22, larger scale protests took place in the capital, 
Damascus and many cities throughout Syria.
 
207   Finally, on April 25, the Syrian regime 
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deployed tanks and soldiers to the Southern city of Daraa and also cut off all forms of 
communication and water.  At this point, a full scale siege was taking place in Daraa to stop the 
protesters.  Reports from sources aired and said that troops from various regiments were not 
taking part in the siege and refusing orders.208  Those same soldiers were being fired upon by 
loyalist forces commanded by the president’s brother, Maher al-Assad.209
 
  This was a sign of 
things to come.  
Remarks 
 
Approximately two months into the peaceful protests, over 1,000 protesters had been 
killed and thousands wounded.  Many thousands had also been detained and held in infamous 
Syrian jails.  While Hezbollah continues to remain silent, the word on the street is that the 
protesters will not be able to bring down the government by force, but that the economy was in 
dire straits.  Tourism, accounting to 18 percent of the economy has come to a standstill.  A $900 
million project to build power plants, one among many, has been scrapped.210 The economy has 
been affected to such an extent that the government is reverting to pay subsidies on certain goods 
hoping to placate the populace.  The government does not have the billions of dollars needed to 
buy out the citizenry as has been done by Saudi Arabia and others.  Therefore, they are offering 
subsidies they can ill afford.  This has more potential of bringing down the government than the 
protests themselves.  As investors continue to get out of the Syrian market, analysts are 
predicting a financial meltdown within 6 months time, meaning Assad’s time could be running 
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out.  In turn, if Hezbollah loses one of its primary patrons, it could have massive repercussions 
on the region as a whole. 
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CHAPTER V: FORCE IN A NEW MILIEU 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has argued that Israel has been the major force behind the increase of 
Hezbollah power over the past three decades.  While Syria and Iran have been strong 
contributors of Hezbollah’s rise in Lebanon, the previous chapters have provided an overview of 
how Hezbollah was able to establish itself and advance into a social and political organization as 
well as a powerful military influence in Southwest Asia.  Hezbollah has also been able to solidify 
itself not only within Lebanon, but also with the Islamic republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab 
republic, two very different countries aligning themselves in the region based on real and 
perceived threats.  Lacking Israeli military actions in Lebanon during the early 1980s, Hezbollah 
may have found great difficulty establishing itself.   
 Internationally, Hezbollah is identified as a terrorist organization, grown out of the 
Middle East and based on alleged Islamic tenants and homegrown militancy in Lebanon.   At 
times researchers have ignored the real causes leading to the creation and growth of Hezbollah in 
the region and on the international stage.   This final chapter will place Israeli military incursions 
as the primary cause for the growth of Hezbollah power and argue that without Israel’s use of 
excessive force during incursions into Lebanon, it is quite possible that Hezbollah may have 
never been established and would not have grown into the current threat that exists today.   
The evident application of this study is how to better understand not just the reasons for 
the growth of Hezbollah power but also, the continued ability of Hezbollah to morph and remain 
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viable despite the withdrawal of Israel from Southern Lebanon.  Israeli military incursions in the 
region have been able to create a situation where Hezbollah has become active, not only as a 
resistance movement but also as a social, political, and economic force in the region.  This comes 
mainly from its ability to follow or gauge Arab public opinion.  The literature has been expanded 
by showing Israel’s role in the growth of Hezbollah power of the last thirty years. 
 
Backlash 
 
As discussed in chapter one, two parties in conflict such as Israel and Hezbollah, may 
lead to one party, Israel in this case, attempting to quickly and easily win a battle using 
overwhelming military force.   One party will assume that the opposition will submit and the 
conflict will come to an end.   Unfortunately, as time as shown, the use of disproportionate force 
in Southwest Asia and throughout the world can cause reactive movements that become more of 
a problem than the initial issue.  It is a natural human reaction not to want to do certain things 
against your will.  In the case of Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the local Shiite Muslim 
population was pushed enough that they decided to take matters into their own hands.  Israel’s 
use of force led to the creation of Hezbollah as a fighting force and the attempt to limit Israeli 
actions in the region based on the needs of the local population.  As Israel did not consider the 
long-term consequences of its disproportionate use of force, it was unable to foresee the response 
of the Muslim Shiites in the south of Lebanon and possible negative long term affects against 
Israel itself. Israel has shown that some military operations can be counterproductive. 
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Initially, the Shiites of Southern Lebanon submitted to Israel’s use of force, believing that 
they would be free from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however, as time went on, they became 
resentful and began working to build up their own powerbase so that they could resist the Israeli 
military.  The excessive uses of force provided an added impetus for the people of Southern 
Lebanon to band together and create a fighting force.  For example, had Israel not entered and 
occupied South Lebanon, the catalyst would not have been created and Iran may not have seen 
an opportunity to create Hezbollah in Lebanon as a method to counter Israel.  While there may 
still have been resentment towards Israel, it would not have been deep enough to take action.  In 
Israel’s case, the military force was so harsh, it created an intense backlash.   
This resentment towards Israel’s repeated incursions into Lebanon served to further 
embolden and escalate Hezbollah’s behavior and pushed them to diversify their range of 
services, resulting in the ability of Hezbollah to also provide healthcare, loans, schooling and 
social assistance.  Case in point, Hezbollah was at the forefront of rebuilding Lebanese schools, 
hospitals and community centers immediately after the 2006 incursion into Lebanon.  Through 
multiple military incursions by Israel, Hezbollah adapted to being able to provide relief 
operations for its own community as well as for others in Lebanon.  Hezbollah spent millions of 
dollars every month delivering medicines, organizing recreational activities for displaced 
children and adults, providing temporary shelters and even hot meals.  Hezbollah leader Hassan 
Nasrallah pledged assistance to anyone whose home or business was destroyed.  In fact, 
Hezbollah has become so adept that within 24 hours of the 2006 cease-fire, a Lebanese television 
station reported that Hezbollah had hotlines ready to assist refugees based on their location of 
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residence and that teams were being sent out to assess the damage and assist in reconstruction 
planning.   
Difficulties also arise because Hezbollah lacks the means to win a decisive battle against 
the Israeli military. While Hezbollah may do what is required to defend against past Israeli 
incursions, they will continue to look for a long-term solution against Israel which creates a 
dangerous precedent.  Hezbollah is continually looking to acquire more sophisticated weaponry.  
While it is still decades away from being on par with Israeli technology, Hezbollah is inching 
closer and closer.   
Despite the fact that the 22-year Israeli occupation of Lebanon has come to an end, the 
Southern Lebanese have felt like victims of aggression and based on these feelings, Hezbollah 
will continue to build up its power structure.  As stated in chapter one, Israeli incursions have 
lead to a costly and escalating arms race where both Israel, via support from the United States, 
and Hezbollah, via support from Iran and Syria, have devoted an even greater share of their 
assets towards increasing weapons stockpiles.  This accumulation of weapons confirms that on 
the Israeli side, they will attempt to deter Hezbollah from firing missiles onto Israeli territory, 
and on Hezbollah’s side, they have the power to defend themselves from Israeli firepower.  
Regardless of the reasoning, the end result is the continuing escalation of violence rather than 
finding a solution to the problem. 
Furthermore, Israel’s disproportionate use of force was widely deemed illegitimate.  
Force should only be used as a last resort and Israel’s justifications for overwhelming use of 
force has not been made to convince many in the region as well as many throughout the 
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international community.   In addition, military force used against civilian targets is deemed 
unacceptable.  These factors allow Hezbollah leeway in terms of their military operations within 
Lebanon.  While they may be firing from civilian areas, Israel used disproportionate force in 
retaliating towards fire from within those areas.   
Had Israel not chosen to use the strategy of military incursions, they would have been 
able to limit the amount of destruction in South Lebanon.  For example, Israel could have 
attempted to use diplomatic means to achieve its goals, especially with the backing of the United 
States Government.  Additionally, the legitimization of the use of force also requires 
justification.  While Israel has attempted to justify its actions, its justifications have not been 
sufficient for the level of military force used within Lebanon, leading to massive resentment, 
which has resulted in the continued backing of Hezbollah and organizations like it.   
 
Strategic Mistakes 
 
In Chapter Two, Lebanon and the 1982, 1996 and 2006 Israeli incursions were discussed.   
The Israeli mentality is discussed showing that issues are seen as a zero-sum game where there is 
an “us versus them” mentality.  This mentality leaves little room for negotiations.  .  A lack of 
trust throughout the world causes Israeli military strategists to plan for the worst and the related 
actions; the initial invasion of Lebanon in 1982 among others, led to disregard for possible 
reactions resulting from the Shiite Muslim population.  This reasoning, as discussed earlier, also 
justifies Israeli military actions as being defensive rather than offensive in nature. Hezbollah’s 
guerrilla warfare strategy has made it very difficult for Israel to respond without heavy collateral 
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damage.  Hezbollah has also been successful in obtaining support from a number of religious and 
ethnic groups within Lebanon.  Israel also failed to assess Hezbollah’s strength resulting in 
inappropriate strategies for multiple incursions.  Israel formal military strategy against an 
asymmetric opponent has repeatedly been a failure. 
 First in 1982, Israel generated the conditions necessary for the birth of Hezbollah.  
Starting with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the dislodging of the PLO, the creation of 
Hezbollah was discussed along with an explanation of the history of Hezbollah and its 
connection to Israeli military incursions in Lebanon.  These incursions were accomplished by 
entering Palestinian-held areas with disregard for the Shiite minority.  The initial goodwill 
created at the riddance of Palestinian fighters in Shiite neighborhoods quickly turned into 
resentment against Israeli activity in the region. The increased resentment by the local Shiite 
population eventually turned into action, leading to the creation of a militant group in Israel’s 
backyard.   
Between 1982 and 1996, Hezbollah was able to expand itself from merely a small 
fighting force to a strong political entity in Lebanon.  Israel’s military attempt to punish the 
Lebanese population failed.  Instead, Hezbollah was supported by a large swath of the Lebanese 
society and they were able to gain a large amount of political power in the process.  Once again, 
this “make or break” Israeli mentality failed Israel in the short and long run in dealing with 
Hezbollah.  
Finally, the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel solidified Hezbollah as a stable actor 
in the region.  Both Iran and Syria have become more willing to back Hezbollah with 
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sophisticated weaponry, as well as political and economic support.  Hezbollah has also proven 
that it can defend and sustain itself within the region, it has also been able to prove its usefulness 
to a secular Arab dictatorship as well as to a religious Iranian democracy.  Hezbollah has been so 
successful that it is purported to have been given scud missiles, a definite game changer in the 
region and one that can put both Syria and Iran in the sights of Israel’s military hawks.211
In Chapter Three, Iranian ideology was discussed along with the Hawala system for 
transferring money and its importance in funding Hezbollah.  Iran has long wanted to export its 
revolution throughout the Arab world, but has been hard-pressed to find an opening throughout 
the years.  After the Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran saw that it could exploit a weak spot amongst 
the Arab Shiite Muslims living in Southern Lebanon.  This opportunity began with a small 
number of Pasdaran troops training local Lebanese and has since taken a life of its own.  
Historically, Israel has not had to deal with this phenomenon of militant groups being able to 
withstand its military assaults.   Palestinian factions were never able to maintain their positions 
since Arab countries were sympathetic to their cause, but limited in their support.  Once these 
limits were crossed, such as occurred in Jordan and Lebanon, the Palestinians had to trade in 
their weapons and once again become displaced in other locations.
  
212
In Chapter Four, the historical context of Syria and its relations with both Lebanon and 
Iran are discussed.  This partnership leads to Syrian involvement with Hezbollah and how this 
  In Hezbollah’s case, the 
fighters are part and parcel of the resistance movement in the area.  Because of this, Iran has 
been able to parley its own interests and use the situation in Lebanon to its benefit while 
benefiting the Lebanese as well.   
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militant organization is used to counter Israeli policy in Lebanon and throughout the region.  
Importantly, in light of the current protests sweeping the region, the Syrian government does not 
have the funds needed to placate its citizenry as has been done by Saudi Arabia and the GCC 
regimes to deal with their own internal uprisings.   The Syrian protesters, therefore, have more of 
a possibility to bring down the government due to financial difficulties rather than through 
peaceful protests.  As major investors continue to watch the economic situation in Syria, the 
longer the protests last, the worse off the government is in terms of keeping the regime together.  
Assad’s time may be running out.   
All the while, Hezbollah is quiet as it watches one of its two primary patrons fight for its 
survival.  Without their support, Hezbollah could become isolated and lose its primary backers.  
Israel on the other hand, is studying the situation to see whether the devil they know will 
continue to be better than the one that may come about should the regime fall. 
 
 
Time to Rethink Israeli Strategy 
 
The Hezbollah-Israel conflict will last for many decades to come unless a breakthrough is 
agreed upon between both Hezbollah and Israel.  However, the situation does not mean that both 
sides are destined for continuous battles.  While the U.S. is attempting to drive a wedge between 
Iran and Syria, the strategy has had limited results.  Both nations are being approached with a 
Western “carrot and stick” philosophy that takes limited consideration for long-term goals. The 
United States must take a look at its current “divide and conquer” philosophy and replace it with 
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one that is more in tune with the intricacies of the region.  Israel understands that in the short 
term, it has the upper hand and can bide it’s time with Hezbollah continuing its current strategy 
of using overwhelming force despite international opinion.  Israel also knows that demographics 
are quickly changing and that success in future conflicts will be more difficult to achieve.  
Hezbollah, on the other hand, understand that it must only survive to find success.  As long as 
Hezbollah can maintain its armaments, and maintain its viability in Lebanese politics, it will 
continue to be a force in the region. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
Israel’s scientific, financial and technological abilities can contribute to the development 
of Southwest Asia and North Africa, the Arab Levant and Mashriq.  This is conditioned upon 
ending the occupation, guaranteeing security for Israel and Israel’s recognition in the region.  
Currently, these issues are in Israel’s favor and some Arab governments are willing to accept 
these conditions while others have to contend with new realities relating to the Arab Spring.  
With closed borders and virtually no integration, Israel will continue to be viewed as a pariah 
state with a limited, vested interest in the region.  The current socioeconomic order, increased 
religious fundamentalism on both sides and the accumulation of arms will certainly create an 
ever-increasing gap between Jews in Israel and backers of Hezbollah and many anti-Israel 
groups in the region.  Israel cannot afford to live in the region with the façade of stability while 
neglecting its neighbors and the needs and expectations of the surrounding Arab populations. 
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The creation and impact of Hezbollah has been felt most radically by Israel and by the 
countries surrounding it.  Hezbollah’s network of backers has been established over decades in 
South Lebanon and because of this, it is the center of resistance against Israeli aspirations in the 
region.  As a result, the effects of Hezbollah have largely been limited to Southwest Asia, with 
limited occurrences outside of the region. More importantly, no simple answer exists as to how 
Hezbollah can be stopped without addressing the core causes of why this organization was 
originally formed and how its power has increased over the last three decades.  International 
organizations must play a more constructive role, along with the United States, rather than trying 
to create further divisions amongst the players in the region, especially amongst Syria and Iran as 
they understand that their long-term interests do not necessarily align with those of the U.S. and 
Israel. 
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